Exploring the Construction of Security in the Canada-United States Action Plan on Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness Consultations by Lalonde, Patrick
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
2012
Exploring the Construction of Security in the
Canada-United States Action Plan on Perimeter




Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd
This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters’ theses of University of Windsor students from 1954 forward. These
documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative
Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the
copyright holder (original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would require the permission of
the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please
contact the repository administrator via email (scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000ext. 3208.
Recommended Citation
Lalonde, Patrick, "Exploring the Construction of Security in the Canada-United States Action Plan on Perimeter Security and
Economic Competitiveness Consultations" (2012). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 52.
Exploring the Construction of Security in the Canada-United States Action Plan on Perimeter Security and 














Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies 
through the Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Criminology 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for 
the Degree of Master of Arts at the 






Windsor, Ontario, Canada 
2012 
© 2012 Patrick C. Lalonde
Exploring the Construction of Security in the Canada-United States Action Plan on Perimeter Security and 
















Dr. John Sutcliffe 








Dr. Amy Fitzgerald 








Dr. Randy Lippert, Advisor 








Dr. Alan Hall, Chair of Defence 







	   iii 
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY 
 I hereby certify that I am the sole author of this thesis and that no part of this thesis has been 
published or submitted for publication. 
 
 I certify that, to the best of my knowledge, my thesis does not infringe upon anyone’s copyright 
nor violate any proprietary rights and that any ideas, techniques, quotations, or any other material from the 
work of other people included in my thesis, published or otherwise, are fully acknowledged in accordance 
with the standard referencing practices. Furthermore, to the extent that I have included copyrighted material 
that surpasses the bounds of fair dealing within the meaning of the Canada Copyright Act, I certify that I 
have obtained a written permission from the copyright owner(s) to include such material(s) in my thesis and 
have included copies of such copyright clearances to my appendix. 
 
 I declare that this is a true copy of my thesis, including any final revisions, as approved by my 
thesis committee and the Graduate Studies office, and that this thesis has not been submitted for a higher 


















	   iv 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis contributes to the criminological (especially the policing and security) and governmentality 
literature by examining constructions of security found in the Action Plan on Perimeter Security and 
Economic Competitiveness consultation process. In analyzing responses via a discourse analysis, this thesis 
identifies how security was constructed in the Action Plan vis-à-vis the various interest groups involved in 
the Action Plan consultation process. The research concludes that the discourses presented in the Action 
Plan systematically differ in patterned ways from discourses identified in the consultation process. The 
discourses found in the Action Plan contribute to an overwhelmingly neo-liberal and economic construction 
of security. These findings contribute to governmentality literature by identifying a need to examine 
beneath official texts in identifying discourses. As well, these findings provide an impetus for future 




















	   v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 I would like to first take the opportunity to thank my thesis committee. To Dr. John Sutcliffe who 
agreed to serve as an external reader to this project – the fact that you were willing to serve on this 
committee and provide wisdom and guidance from a Political Science perspective was amazing. What was 
more amazing is that you were willing to do it all while on sabbatical. Thank you. To Dr. Amy Fitzgerald 
who served as second reader to this project – your astute observations and constructive criticism at every 
step in the process helped guide me at every moment in reconsidering my every statement no matter how 
apparently profound or apparently insignificant. Your passion for academia and for opening eyes to the 
unknown, under-appreciated, and under-researched areas of criminology is a wonderful example for all. 
And most importantly to Dr. Randy Lippert who served as my thesis advisor – your unrivaled attention to 
detail and unwavering patience as well as your constant demands for perfection in your graduate students 
made this thesis what it is and also made me a better person as a result. You inspire everyone around you to 
reach higher and go further, and without you this thesis would not have been possible. For this, I am 
eternally grateful. 
 To my fellow cohort of MA Criminology students at the University of Windsor – Brandon, 
Cassandra, Jaspreet, Jolina, Martine, Stephanie, Tony – as well as those MA Sociology students I had the 
pleasure of sharing time with – Adeline, Leslie, Marie, and Steve – they say it takes a village to raise a 
child, and I sincerely believe that it takes an entire cohort to write a thesis. Your unwavering support and 
friendships sustained me on even the most difficult of days over the past two years of my life and for that I 
am also eternally grateful. May our friendships and professional working relationships continue long into 
the future, and may we keep in touch wherever we go in life. 
 To my two best friends Shae and Aaron with whom I lived over the better part of the last two years 
– your patience and unwavering support of my goals were truly essential in writing this thesis. Both of your 
own professional pursuits also served as excellent reminders of the merits of hard work as well as pushing 
forward regardless of the odds. Thank you. 
 To Stephanie – your unquestioning love and support no matter what the circumstance and no 
matter what the odds is proof in itself of your outstanding character as a human being, as a grad student, and 
as my girlfriend. There were a great many days when you put this all into perspective for me and kept me 
moving forward and for that, I am truly eternally grateful and cannot even begin to think of how much of 






















	   vi 
DEDICATION 
 
 I would like to dedicate this thesis to my parents – Patricia and Raymond – whose careful 
guidance, unparalleled example, and love throughout my childhood made me the academic and the man I 
am today. Your unquestioning support and constant acceptance toward not only my MA but in every aspect 
of my life always is truly what made this thesis possible. Both of you have provided me with knowledge 
and experiences that have made all things possible in my life, and for that, from the bottom of my heart I 









































	   vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY      iii   
ABSTRACT          iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS        v 
DEDICATION          vi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS        viii 
 
 1. INTRODUCTION        1 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK      2 
 Governmentality        2 
 Neo-Liberalism        5 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW       10 
4. METHODS         16 
5. RESULTS         20 
 Introduction        20 
 Business Interest Group Security Discourses    20 
 Introduction to Business Interest Group Submissions   20 
  1. Toward a More Predictable Border    21 
  2. Performance and Efficiency Metrics of Border Security  27 
  3. Emphasizing Risk Management     28 
  4. Rewards for Private Partners in Public Security   30 
 Business Interest Group Summary      31 
 Individual Canadian Citizen Security Discourses    32 
 Introduction of Individual Canadian Citizen Submissions   32 
  1. The Law-Abiding Citizen Appeal     32 
  2. The Perils of Canada-U.S. Collaboration    38 
  3. Human Rights Discourse      40 
  4. Combating Illegal Immigration and Fraudulent Refugees  44 
 Other Interest Group Security Discourses     46 
 Introduction to Other Interest Group Submissions     46 
  1. Human Rights Discourse     46 
  2. A Dualistic Immigration Perspective    51 
  3. Risk-Based Pre-Emptive Techniques and Technologies  52 
6. ANALYSIS         55 
 Which Discourses Were Reflected in the Action Plan?   55 
 Business Interest Group Discourses     55 
 Individual Canadian Citizen and Other Interest Group Discourses  61 
 What Governmentality Can Be Discerned?    65 
 Business Interest Group Security Discourses    65 
 Individual Canadian Citizen and Other Interest Group Security Discourses 67 
 Action Plan Security Discourses      69 
 What Are the Implications for Governmentality Studies?   72 
7. CONCLUSION        74 
 
NOTES           77 
REFERENCES          79 








	   viii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ATAC – Air Transport Association of Canada 
ATI – Access to Information 
B3 – Business for Better Borders 
BBWG – Beyond the Border Working Group 
CBP – Customs and Border Protection (U.S.) 
CBSA – Canada Border Services Agency 
CCLA – Canadian Civil Liberties Association 
CCPA – Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives 
CERC – Canadian Employee Relocation Council 
CFIB – Canadian Federation of Independent Business 
CIFFA – Canadian International Freight Forwarders Association  
CIU – Customs and Immigration Union 
CMC – Canadian Manufacturing Coalition 
COPA – Canadian Oilseed Processors Association 
CSA – Customs Self Assessment Program 
CSCB – Canadian Society of Customs Brokers 
C-TPAT – Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 
DUI – Driving Under the Influence 
DWI – Driving While Intoxicated 
ESTA – Electronic System for Travel Authorization 
FAST – Free and Secure Trade 
GOC – Government of Canada 
INS – Immigration and Naturalization Service (U.S.) 
IRPA – Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
IRPP – Institute for Research on Public Policy 
NAFTA – North American Free Trade Agreement 
NGO – Non-Government Organization 
OPC – Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
PBOA – Public Border Operators Association 
PIP – Partners in Protection 
PIPEDA – Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
PNWER – Pacific NorthWest Economic Region 
RCC – Regulatory Cooperation Council 
RCMP – Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
SCM – Supply Chain Management 
TIAC – Tourism Industry Association of Canada 
US-VISIT – United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Technology 
	   1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 On February 4th, 2011, United States President Barack Obama and Canadian Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper convened a joint announcement to unveil a shared vision for perimeter security and 
economic competitiveness and on December 7th, 2011, convened for a second time to announce a formal 
agreement between the United States and Canada on an Action Plan on Perimeter Security and Economic 
Competiveness. This agreement is built on the foundation of several previous agreements.  These include 
the Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on 
Emergency Management Cooperation 2008, Canada-United States Framework for the Movement of Goods 
and People Across the Border During and Following an Emergency 2009 (Government of Canada 2011), as 
well as a long history of other border agreements between the two countries.1 This new Action Plan on 
Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness is distinguished – particularly in mass media – from 
those agreements preceding and following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 by its perceived 
exceptional surrendering of Canadian sovereignty and of individual rights of Canadians to the United States 
government. Most mass media sources, in turn, have situated the agreement as an exceptional policy 
whereby the Canadian government sacrifices rights and freedoms in the name of security in a zero-sum give 
and take relationship. 
While this agreement was indeed formed from careful policy development between both nations 
through a policy development group – the Beyond the Border Working Group (BBWG) – the security 
agreement was also shaped from a calculated governmentality involving interactions among the state, key 
stakeholders, industry, and individual citizens in re-defining the meaning of security itself. This was 
ostensibly achieved largely through the Government of Canada’s use of an extensive consultation process 
ultimately garnering responses from over 140 individual organizations and interest groups and 1000 
individual citizens. The Government of Canada planned to then use these responses in drafting the Action 
Plan with the United States. In this respect, the Government of Canada stated in a publication summarizing 
its findings of the consultation process, “Overall, the Government of Canada believes that the input 
Canadians have provided will ensure an Action Plan that better aligns with the interests of Canadians, and 
of Canada” (emphasis added GOC 2011b: 5). In analyzing a sample of the aforementioned consultation 
process responses via a discourse analysis, this thesis seeks to identify how security was constructed and in 
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turn highlight the construction(s) of security developed vis-à-vis the various groups involved in the 
consultation process of the Action Plan on Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness. Adopting a 
governmentality approach, this thesis asks four main questions: What specifically is being problematized 
through this international border security agreement? How do these problematizations contribute to how 
security itself is constructed within the policy? What governmentality can be discerned shaping stakeholder 
constructions of security in the context of the new policy? What are the broader implications of the findings 
for governmentality studies? 
 While recent literature has reflected on risk and security in relation to contemporary border 
practices (e.g. Pratt 2006, Bell 2006, Aradau and Van Munster 2007, Lyon 2007, Muller 2009) few have 
studied in criminology or sociology how security – including what comes to be defined as risks as well as 
the methods for reducing risk – comes to be defined through a complex governmentality in which various 
groups provide constructions to complement or rival those of the state. This thesis seeks to build on the 
criminological (especially the policing and security) literature by exploring how security is constructed by 
using the case study of consultations on the Action Plan on Perimeter Security and Economic 
Competitiveness. This is a complex process whereby the state, consultation with various stakeholders and 
individual citizens, as well as direct critiques of the consultation process itself are seen to ultimately 
contribute to the construction of security. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Governmentality 
 This thesis adopts a governmentality framework.  According to Rose (1999), an analytics of 
government examines “what authorities of various sorts wanted to happen, in relation to problems defined 
how, in pursuit of what objectives, through what strategies and techniques” (Rose 1999:20). In essence, the 
nature of governmentality inquiry is to examine how certain forces, events, or authorities act to 
problematize the conduct of persons, or, in other words, how certain actions or non-actions of individuals 
come under the scope of governmental control to achieve certain ends. Governmentality relies on forms of 
knowledge in terms of “ideas and beliefs about economy, society, authority, morality and subjectivity” that 
act to form the aforementioned problematizations and lead to strategies, tactics, and programs of 
government (Rose 1999:21). In doing so, in every examination of governmentality, and particularly in the 
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case of the Action Plan on Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness, the scope must not consider 
the state as the sole actor and decision maker in terms of the problematization of conduct and subsequent 
remedies. According to Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde: 
…Instead of seeing any single body—such as the state—as responsible for managing the conduct 
of citizens, this perspective recognizes that a whole variety of authorities govern in different sites, 
in relation to different objectives. Hence, a… set of questions emerges: Who governs what? 
According to what logics? With what techniques? Toward what ends? As an analytical 
perspective, then, governmentality is far from a theory of power, authority, or even of governance. 
Rather, it asks particular questions of the phenomena that it seeks to understand, questions 
amenable to precise answers through empirical inquiry (2006: 85). 
 
A governmentality approach must consider government as part of a complex social system whereby various 
other social actors provide input and mediate what is defined as problematic as well as the best way for 
remedying such conduct. In turn, through a Foucauldian discourse analysis of documentation, we can 
identify language and other signifying systems that are elements in forming and shaping realities and 
subjectivities, which in turn render reality governable (Rose et al. 2006: 89). We should therefore be able to 
identify how the complex of changing discourses act to mediate the development of problematized conduct 
as well as the subsequent remedies used (Rose 1999:22). 
 Lippert and Stenson (2010) provide an explanation of what studies of governmentality seek to 
achieve. Citing Donzelot (1979), Lippert and Stenson highlight a governmentality research programme that 
deploys three concepts: rationalities, technologies, and programmes. Rationalities may be defined as: 
A way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can govern; what 
governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form of that activity thinkable 
and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was practiced (Gordon 1991: 3 
as cited in Lippert and Stenson 2010: 477). 
 
Technologies refer to intellectual and material means and routines that make different forms of rule 
possible, while programmes refer to prescriptions, plans or schema for acting on some aspect of social 
conduct (Lippert and Stenson 2010: 477). Collectively, these contribute to an identification of the objectives 
of government and what plans will be used to implement these objectives. Accordingly, this thesis seeks to 
identify the discourses by moving beneath official “tidy texts” (Lippert and Stenson 2010) to determine 
how and why certain conduct is rendered problematic, and how these problematic activities are remedied 
through the Action Plan itself. Are terrorism and domestic security the primary problems? Is the economy 
also a primary problem of security? What takes precedence when it comes to security within this particular 
international Action Plan: security from terrorism, domestic security from other threats, or security from 
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domestic or continental economic crises? How the complex of government, public and private interest 
groups, individual citizen participation and so forth mediates the understanding of security within this new 
program will be revealed.  
 Foucault (2007) himself attempted to answer the question “What are we to understand by 
security?” According to Foucault, by moving beyond disciplinary mechanisms, security is not a binary 
division between the permitted and the prohibited but rather an optimal average of behavior that is 
essentially a form of “bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded” (Foucault 2007: 6). 
Accordingly, security allows behavior to happen and moderates flows not toward perfection – as would be 
the goal of disciplinary regimes – but rather toward “maximizing the positive elements, for which one 
provides the best possible circulation, and of minimizing what is risky and inconvenient… while knowing 
that they will never be completely suppressed” (Foucault 2007: 19). Similarly, instead of operating as a 
centripetal function concentrating, enclosing, protecting and ultimately trying to eradicate a behavior, 
security instead is a centrifugal function according to Foucault, “[having] the constant tendency to 
expand… [with] new elements… constantly being integrated… [and] allowing the development of ever-
wider circuits” (Foucault 2007: 45). As well, according to Foucault, security is future-focused and attempts 
to plan a “milieu” of possible events or series of events that need to be regulated within a framework based 
on many possible meanings and interpretations (Foucault 2007: 20). From the governmentality perspective, 
the ultimate goal of security is to move beyond governing the individual – as is the case in disciplinary 
governance – and instead attempt to affect in a precise manner a population, defined by Foucault as, “a 
multiplicity of individuals who are and fundamentally and essentially only exist biologically bound to the 
materiality within which they live” (Foucault 2007: 21).  
 Dillon and Neal (2011) summarize Foucault’s novel contributions to understanding security as 
follows: 
Foucault’s key innovation of a dispositive de sécurité has less to do with protection and 
preservation than it does with circulation, cultivation, promotion and fructification. It has less to do 
with a people than a population. Little to do with will and more to do with statistics, patterns and 
behavioural regularities. Above all, Foucault’s security has less to do with certainty than with 
contingency (Dillon and Neal 2011: 11). 
 
Dillon (2008) follows from the work of Foucault and others in the field of security and governmentality by 
explaining a biopolitics of security itself. This biopolitics of security installs risk as one of its most 
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important technologies (Dillon 2008: 310). Risk may essentially be defined according to Dillon as “an 
assemblage of mechanisms for measuring and commodifying exposure to contingency” (Dillon 2008: 310). 
Since contingency is a necessary factor of life itself, biopolitically speaking, life cannot be secured against 
contingency (or risk) but rather, may only be secured vis-à-vis contingency (Dillon 2008: 314). According 
to Dillon, this biopoliticizing of security is a historical phenomenon and thus “it is a project and not an 
accomplishment. It is therefore a plural and changing thing, and it changes according to different accounts 
of what it is to be a ‘living thing’” (Dillon 2008: 310). Following a Foucauldian governmentality 
perspective then, Dillon states that the biopolitics of security constitutes a plural and changing nexus of 
power/knowledge. This power/knowledge, according to Dillon, cannot be assumed. Rather, how they are 
allied together must be discerned and established. Furthermore, we must establish “how and why 
biopolitical technologies of governance constitute a distinctive dispositif de sécurité, an assemblage of 
particular kinds of security technologies and practices operating according to their own particular logic” 
(Foucault 2007 as cited in Dillon 2008: 311). 
Neo-Liberalism  
 Neo-liberalism will be considered while following the governmentality perspective of this thesis. 
According to Rose and Miller (2010), neo-liberalism is characterized by its opposition to welfare liberalism. 
Neo-liberalism is, “Against the assumption that the ills of social and economic life are to be addressed by 
the activities of government” (Rose and Miller 2010: 295). In this way, neo-liberal economic thinking 
juxtaposes the perceived inefficiencies of planned economies with truly free markets, advocating for 
markets themselves to replace planning in terms of regulation of economic activity (Rose and Miller 2010: 
296). The aspects of government that were formerly under welfare liberalism constructed as state 
responsibilities are instead – as far as possible – transformed into commodified notions that are therefore 
regulated by market principles (Rose and Miller 2010: 296). As such, an active entrepreneurship of 
individuals and organizations ultimately replaces the perceived passivity and dependency engendered under 
welfare liberalism (Rose and Miller 2010: 296). Individuals are therefore responsibilized to obtain and 
optimize their own quality of life without state intervention. According to O’Malley (2000), one of the 
distinctions between welfare liberalism and neo-liberalism is the emergence in the latter of a field of expert-
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driven risk analysis, which has developed largely during the twentieth century (464). O’Malley goes on to 
say, 
The prudent subjects of neo-liberalism should practice and sustain their autonomy by assembling 
information, materials and practices together into a personalized strategy that identifies and 
minimizes their exposure to harm. Such risk management is frequently, and perhaps increasingly, 
associated with access to statistical or actuarial technologies and expert advice that render 
measurable the (probabilistic) calculation of future harms (O’Malley 2000: 465). 
 
According to O’Malley, this actuarial risk management will spark the continued growth of predictive 
technologies that minimize the impact of those risks that are costly for the corporate (or individual) 
“enterprise of uncertainty” (2000: 480). This shift in economic policies then results in corporations that are 
essentially obsessed with risk management, single-focused on reducing costs and maximizing profit, and 
resistant to any form of government management or regulation that might act to negatively influence the 
supply chain or profit potential of businesses and business groups (Snider 2000). 
 An examination of neo-liberal governmentality by Foucault (2008) details how originally there 
exists in any market economy the economy itself and also “an active, intense, and interventionist social 
policy” (160). However, according to Foucault, such a social policy is designed so as not to remove the 
negative effects of the market economy, but rather bolster such an economic arrangement by removing all 
possible anti-competitive mechanisms existing in or possibly able to arise within a society. Thus there 
develops the problematic of law which acts to complicate the competitiveness of the economy and a 
juridicial redefinition is necessary to essentially nullify these complications (Foucault 2008: 160). 
Accordingly, neo-liberalism in North America can be traced to an economic crisis surrounding government 
interventionism, influence, and action over the economy. One such way neo-liberalism functions to limit 
government intervention, according to Foucault, is through the use of the economic grid as a sort of gauge 
to test governmental action and, “object to activities of the public authorities on the grounds of their abuses, 
excesses, futility, and wasteful expenditure” (Foucault 2008: 246). Foucault says this  
involves scrutinizing every action of the public authorities in terms of the game of supply and 
demand, in terms of efficiency with regard to the particular elements of this game, and in terms of 
the cost of intervention by the public authorities in the field of the market (2008: 246).  
 
Neo-liberalism therefore demarcates a shift in terms of measuring government interventionism. Prior to 
neo-liberalism governments were generally assessed in terms of the “rightness” of their actions, whereas 
under neo-liberalism, criticisms are levied as they apply exclusively to economic and market terms 
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(Foucault 2008: 247). In essence, enacting a policy or procedure that undermines the market is perceived to 
be done in bad faith and is also considered to be bad politics. Thus develops a reversal of laissez-faire 
according to Foucault. Whereas laissez-faire economic policy under classical liberalism served as a check 
on government in terms of respecting the free market, in neo-liberalism laissez-faire is turned around and 
instead used not as a self-limitation of government but rather as a tool against government itself. This 
enables each action of government to be measured and assessed in laissez-faire and economic terms, and, 
according to Foucault, “is a sort of permanent economic tribunal confronting government” (Foucault 2008: 
247). Ultimately what results is a maximization of freedom, but only in the context of “economic freedom”.  
 Harvey (2005) highlights the shift since the 1970s in government to a pervasive neo-liberal 
political-economic way of thinking characterized by an apparatus Harvey refers to as the “neoliberal state”. 
This is characterized by the state attending to freedoms that “reflect the interests of private property owners, 
businesses, multinational corporations, and financial capital” (Harvey 2005: 7). Harvey details a history of 
corporate influence in the spread of neo-liberalism, starting with a coup in Chile backed by U.S. 
corporations, the Chicago school of economics, and the American state that dismantled social welfare 
mechanisms and was perceived to free the labour market from regulatory and institutional restraints. The 
subsequent revival of the Chilean economy in terms of growth rates, capital accumulation, and high rates of 
return on foreign investments was short-lived, but a more pragmatic version of neo-liberalism was spawned 
as a result and provided powerful evidence to support subsequent turns to neo-liberalism in both Britain and 
the United States in the 1980s (Harvey 2005: 9). These methods strongly advocated for by corporate 
interests were met with enthusiasm by governments attempting to combat the crisis of capital accumulation 
in the 1970s that resulted in a combination of rising unemployment and accelerating inflation. These 
methods were also far more widely accepted than the perceived communist “socialist threat” emerging as 
the other possible – but less palpable choice for the business elite – solution to the economic crisis (Harvey 
2005: 14). After neo-liberal economic policies were implemented in Britain and the United States in the late 
1970s, the income of the top 1 per cent of income earners exploded, ultimately creating “the restoration or 
reconstruction of the power of the economic elites” that served and still serves today to self-sustain the neo-
liberal economic order as a result (Harvey 2005: 19). In turn, the neo-liberal economic order should be 
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considered in examining the Action Plan given the recent dominance of neo-liberal techniques of 
governmentality since the 1970s.  
By using the governmentality perspective described by Rose (1999) and Lippert and Stenson 
(2010), and posited in Foucault (2007) – as well as by considering the neo-liberal economic order – in 
examining the Action Plan on Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness this thesis will determine 
how particular actors mediated the construction(s) of security, the realization of particular conduct(s) as 
problematic and in need of remedy, and in realizing the necessary remedy – or remedies – to the 
problematized conduct. In other words, this thesis is examining the security cultures in place to try to 
understand what exactly is a “threat” and what exactly appropriate responses entail (Monahan 2010). This is 
best accomplished through a governmentality approach inviting examination of the complex of changing 
discourses created through the influence of a variety of authorities acting to mediate the development of 
problematized conduct as well as the subsequent remedies used. Through examining the power/knowledge 
nexus behind the Action Plan, this thesis will be able to track what Foucault (2007) refers to as the dispositif 
de sécurité, or an assemblage of particular kinds of security technologies and practices operating according 
to their own particular logic through a centrifugal process involving ever-wider circuits in terms of scope, 
and working to control the circulation of a milieu of possible conducts that have been problematized. 
Through identifying the various authorities, the conduct that has been problematized, the remedies for 
problematized conduct, as well as the power relations at play, this thesis will be able to use the 
governmentality approach to find how security is constructed in the Action Plan itself. 
 A two-pronged approach is necessary when examining the Action Plan on Perimeter Security and 
Economic Competitiveness. Firstly, a governmentality approach is necessary to determine how particular 
actors mediated the construction(s) of security, the realization of particular conduct(s) as problematic and in 
need of remedy, and in realizing the necessary remedy – or remedies – to the problematized conduct. In 
other words, this thesis is examining the security cultures in place to try to understand what exactly is a 
“threat” and what exactly appropriate responses entail (Monahan 2010). Secondly, one must realize that 
security has a multiplicity of meanings and understandings. According to Zedner (2003), individual 
understandings of security can include security as a negative or a positive technique, as a material or 
symbolic good, as a commodity in the form or either a public or private good, as an internal or external 
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matter (especially in the context of the state), and as a state of being and/or as a means to achieve this state 
of being. By identifying problematized behaviour as well as the context in which security is presented, this 
thesis will begin to understand how security is constructed in reference to the Action Plan on Perimeter 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Examinations of private security have become far more prolific in the criminological literature (see 
for example Kempa, Stenning and Wood 2004; O’Connor, Lippert, Greenfield, and Boyle 2004; Lippert 
and O’Connor 2006). However, a significant gap in the literature exists when determining just how security 
is understood and mediated by various interest groups, stakeholders, individual citizens, and so forth 
interacting with government inside liberal states. As stated by Goold, Loader, and Thumala (2010) in 
examining security consumption, 
. . .despite the amount of academic interest in security, it remains an under-developed and under-
researched concept (Loader and Walker, 2007; Waldron, 2007; Zedner, 2009). Although 
frequently invoked as a lens through which we can view the ebb and flow of life in late-modern 
societies, the social processes that shape our alleged preoccupation with security and the specific 
ways in which this preoccupation manifests itself are rarely examined in any great detail (Goold, 
Loader, and Thumala 2010:4). 
 
While Goold, Loader, and Thumala (2010) examine the consumption of security in private security 
markets, the same conclusion may be made about the semantic aspects of security. Current examinations of 
security are rooted in implicit assumptions about how security is defined within contemporary society 
without explicitly delving into the broad kaleidoscope of meanings provided by the independent and 
interconnected views of government, private industry, interest groups, and private citizen investment. 
Ultimately what this means is that security is understood and used based on convention and not based on a 
concrete understanding of how certain conduct comes to be problematized, and how subsequent techniques 
offer potential solutions to the problematized behavior vis-à-vis strategies, tactics, and programs of 
government. Therefore, this thesis attempts to bridge this gap by examining a social process (i.e. the BBWG 
consultation process) that shapes and defines the parameters, scope, and construction of security as it relates 
to the Canada-United States Action Plan on Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness specifically. 
What follows is an examination of previous constructions of security found in the literature. 
 Ericson (2007) attempts to define and understand securitization in contemporary Western society. 
He argues that Western society has seen an explosion of the use of risk language within security discourse 
congruent with the rise of neo-liberalism. According to Ericson, “People need, above all, knowledge and 
technologies of risk in order to function as neo-liberal subjects… in a regime that stresses uncertainty, a 
stress that can only be coped with through knowledge of risk and its promise of competitive advantage in 
risk-taking, prosperity, security, and freedom” (Ericson 2007:7). Risk in turn becomes the term whereby we 
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mitigate the stresses of uncertainty by imagining and acting as if we can predict the future and thus act on 
those predictions. According to Ericson, the paradox is that since it is strictly speaking impossible to predict 
the future, “indeterminacy is the rule and uncertainty magnifies” (Ericson 2007:8). What develops then is a 
cycle of risk whereby solutions to risk only act to create more and more risks requiring more and more 
solutions. However, according to Ericson (2007), what ultimately is defined as a risk is not based on a 
homogeneous neutral vocabulary for bridging facts and values, but rather: 
The identification of risks that require attention involves a political process of selection in which 
some harms are given special attention while others are relatively unattended or ignored. 
Moreover, the harms selected are coded as threats to the security and prosperity at the heart of the 
liberal social imaginary, and this code legitimates intensified control including criminalization 
(Hacking 2003 as cited in Ericson 2007:14). 
 
While Ericson goes on to situate the state as having the ability to exert its force almost indiscriminately on 
its people, this thesis will attempt to determine what other social groups and forces are possibly at play as 
well and thus examine multiple constructions of security beyond those of the state. 
 The criminological literature surrounding security has largely posited security as antithetical to 
liberalism, much as was the case for Ericson (2007). In these cases, security is constructed as a technology 
of governance that causes an imbalance between security and liberty, or as a technology whereby civil 
liberties are infringed upon by exceptional remedies for problematized conduct. For example, Roach (2003) 
explains that while many of the consequences of the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act fall under Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms section I as reasonable limits on rights under the law, “This flexibility does 
not, however, take away from the fact that the legislation violates and limits some important rights” (Roach 
2003:88). Roach then proceeds to highlight the various arguments suggesting that the Anti-Terrorism Act 
violates the rule of law in regard to the presumption of innocence, fundamental freedoms, privacy, equality, 
right to silence, self-incrimination, right to a fair trial, and so forth. Amoore (2006) demonstrates that the 
biometric border – which is actually a key component of the Action Plan on Perimeter Security and 
Economic Competitiveness itself – performs something like Agamben’s homo sacer in which living is 
reduced to calculability resulting in the individual being “killed and yet not sacrificed” (Agamben 1998 as 
cited in Amoore 2006: 348). In this way, the individual is completely stripped of his or her rights and left in 
a state of lawlessness. Welch (2007) concludes that regarding the U.S. lead war on terror, the absence of 
accountability creates a sovereign impunity that allows the state and its operatives to engage in crimes and 
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human rights abuses without fear of penalties (Welch 2007: 147).  Hudson (2009) similarly states, “The war 
on terror, appears to be driven by hatred and vengeance rather than a concern for justice to the other” 
(Hudson 2009: 715). O’Malley (2010) in his examination of telemetric policing states, “In place of [the] 
governable individual, simulated justice creates and deploys what Deleuze (1995) refers to as ‘dividuals’” 
(O’Malley 2010: 796). Electronic policing – the traffic camera used to issue a ticket for speeding for 
example – then removes notions of “I” or “me” and instead creates the “dividual” through relying on codes 
and data in order to detect, convict, and prosecute transgressions of order without human involvement 
whatsoever. O’Malley argues that what develops as a result of simulated justice is a “simulated freedom” 
that seeks to limit the mobilization of individuals – including the very rights and liberties that are 
characteristic of liberalism itself (O’Malley 2010: 805). 
All of the above examples pose an important problematic for this thesis. Namely, they each 
challenge the construction of security in Foucault (2007) suggesting that security is a direct correlate of 
liberalism in which there is “no longer the exceptions and privileges attached to one person, but the 
possibility of movement, changes of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things” 
(Foucault 2007: 71). As such, when answering the three questions surrounding what behaviour is 
problematized, how these problematizations contribute to construction of security, and particularly what 
governmentalities can be discerned shaping stakeholder constructions of security in the context of the new 
policy, Foucault would believe necessarily that liberalism is inherently tied to those governmentalities and 
power relations present in problematizing behaviour and constructing security. While this of course stands 
in stark contrast to the above “illiberal” conceptions of security, some recent literature ultimately follows 
Foucault’s perspective. 
Bigo and Tsoukala (2008) move away from the notion posited by Ericson (2007) and others that 
the state is an all-powerful manipulator of public policy and utilizes exceptional and illiberal practices and 
techniques to support its efforts of security while also effectively sacrificing individual rights and freedoms. 
Rather, Bigo and Tsoukala say “we consider [illiberal practices] as a result of the very functioning of a 
solidly constituted security field of professionals of management of unease, both public and private, 
working together…” (Bigo and Tsoukala 2008:4). In this way, while illiberal (or exceptional) practices are 
ultimately produced as a result of the debate surrounding security, according to Bigo (2008), we should not 
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consider exception as occurring outside of liberalism, but rather consider it working hand in hand with 
liberalism and actually helping us understand the normal functioning of liberalism (Bigo 2008:33). 
According to Bigo and Tsoukala (2008), as soon as we can refuse such grandiose “illiberal” narratives we 
can begin working toward a sociology of security producers and of their different audiences (Bigo and 
Tsoukala 2008:4). In turn, they advocate for abandoning security as a fixed normative value that is 
consistent across space and time and instead consider security as a social and political construction related 
to but not limited to various “speech acts”. As such, “They are themselves the result of structural 
competition between actors with different forms of capital and legitimacy over contradictory definitions of 
security and different interests” (Bigo and Tsoukala 2008:4-5).  
Neocleous (2008) goes perhaps a step further than Bigo and Tsoukala (2008) in challenging the 
very notion of illiberal practices themselves as they relate to security. Neocleous (2008) offers an 
alternative explanation basically stating that this relationship is nothing but an assumption reliant on a 
question of balance that is inherently a liberal creation. Neocleous states, “Aside from lacking any 
empirical evidence and often involving the giving-up of the liberties of others, usually minorities, the whole 
approach based on ‘balancing’ presupposes that ‘balance’ is self-evidently a worthy goal… and thus acts as 
a substitute for real argument” (Neocleous 2008:12). Neocleous details a history of classical liberalism and 
illustrates how classical liberalism was actually accepting of the compromising of liberty, “[giving] it a 
fundamental place in regimes supposedly founded on consent” (Neocleous 2008:24). What Neocleous 
concludes in starting his critique of security is that he is driving toward “the liberal use of emergency 
powers within a broader ideology of the ‘state of emergency’ a state in which, in the liberal view, is an 
order of security entirely consistent with its principle of liberty” (Neocleous 2008:38). According to 
Neocleous (2008), while the state of emergency itself is a common feature of both the liberal and fascist 
state, “Indeed it was liberalism which perfected the practice” (Neocleous 2008:58). Neocleous then 
questions the liberal call for a return to “normalcy” based on this same logic. According to Neocleous then, 
so called exceptional security is justified and legitimized through constitutional acceptance of such policies 
in that constitutions are ultimately designed to uphold the security of the state itself. Accordingly, “To 
criticize the use of emergency powers in terms of suspension of the law, then, is to make the mistake of 
conterposing normality and emergency, law and violence” (Neocleous 2008: 71). 
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 Bell (2011) similarly challenges the assumption that freedom and security are inherently linked in 
a give and take relationship. Rooting the preservation of freedom in the context of security as a liberal 
conception of the political, according to Bell, “…security’s harnessing of freedom fundamentally shapes the 
horizon of politics; it shapes how politics are practiced and the kinds of debates that receive attention, not 
least of all legitimizing the infringement of civil liberties for the protection of ‘free society’” (Bell 
2011:151). To illustrate this relationship, Bell examines the security certificate program in Canada. 
According to Public Safety Canada, the security certificate program is a form of immigration hearing 
designed to remove non-Canadians from Canada who are deemed to “pose a serious threat to Canada and 
Canadians”. Accordingly, “The Government of Canada issues a certificate only in exceptional 
circumstances where the information to determine the case cannot be disclosed without endangering the 
safety of any person or national security” (Public Safety Canada 2009). Bell (2011) essentially argues that 
while many (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998; Dyzenhaus 2001; Schmitt 1985; Schmitt 1996 as cited in 
Bell 2011) have stated that the Canadian security certificates operate in direct opposition to liberalism, the 
character of the certificates program and the “contours” of the subsequent 2007 Supreme Court ruling 
(Charkaoui v. Canada 2007) striking down the security certificate provisions of the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act but upholding the certificates “in principle” collectively, “underscore the role of 
exceptional politics within (and not without) the arsenal of liberal strategies of governance” (Bell 2011:57). 
According to Bell then, “Efforts to understand what security means… require[s] that we implicate liberal 
politics in practices of security rather than assume such practices to be moments of illiberal excess” (Bell 
2011:151).  
 Monahan (2006) takes a similar point of view. Introducing a collection of work focused on 
questioning surveillance and security, Monahan questions why surveillance and security are “always” 
framed in terms of trade-offs. According to Monahan: 
Some of the most common expressions of trade-offs are security versus liberty, security versus 
privacy, security versus freedom… But seemingly, once the issues are presented in these terms, the 
only thing left to decide is whether the public is willing to make the necessary sacrifices to bring 
about greater national security. Absent are discussions about the policies behind surveillance and 
security systems, what one means by “security”, [and] what (or who) gets left out of the 
conversation… (Monahan 2006:1-2). 
 
According to Monahan (2006), the drawback of questions about trade-offs is that root causes are not 
engaged and in turn, deeper social changes resulting from security itself are left unexamined (Monahan 
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2006:10). Instead, according to Monahan, we should consider technologies of security as “social inventions 
to begin with and part of the social problems they are intended to correct” (Monahan 2006:10). It is from 
this orientation that we may proceed in asking the “right” questions about security according to Monahan – 
not those questions that rely on trade-off relationships between security and liberty that function simply as 
smokescreens from a functional understanding of the meaning of security itself. Namely, this involves 
questions of power, including: what social relations do surveillance and security systems produce? Through 
asking questions such as this, Monahan states, “by attending to the embedding of surveillance [and security] 
technologies into existing institutional systems and social practices, power relations are much easier to 
detect” (Monahan 2006: 14).  
Taking the lead of the “security as illiberalism” approach of Roach (2003), Amoore (2006), Welch 
(2007), Hudson (2009) and O’Malley (2010), as well as the “security as liberalism” approach of Bigo and 
Tsoukala (2008), Neocleous (2008), Bell (2011), and Monahan (2006) it is evident that security must be 
investigated empirically to understand how various groups think about security in a given context. As 
identified above, while some groups may view security as moments of illiberal excess, others view security 
in the same context to be instead embodied within and governed by liberalism. The debate surrounding 
liberalism is one example of potentially more constructions of security – albeit a very significant one – that 
could be identified in an analysis of how the various groups providing input on the Action Plan on 
Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness ultimately shape security. These differing constructions 
of security in the debate over security and liberalism provide an opportunity for this thesis to add to the 
criminological literature by exploring potential other constructions of security and problematized behaviour 
within the specific context of the Action Plan vis-à-vis the various social actors providing input. 
Determining how security is constructed was accomplished using the procedures and an empirical discourse 
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4. METHODS 
This section details the procedures and methods used to respond to the following research 
questions (outlined above): What specifically is being problematized through this international border 
security agreement? How do these problematizations contribute to how security itself is constructed within 
the policy? What governmentality can be discerned shaping stakeholder constructions of security in the 
context of the new policy? What are the broader implications of the findings for governmentality studies? 
A discourse analysis was conducted to understand how security is defined and understood within a 
specific context, in this case, the Canada-United States Action Plan on Perimeter Security and Economic 
Competitiveness. Discourse refers to “groups of statements which structure the way a thing is thought, and 
the way we act on the basis of that thinking… in other words… a particular knowledge about the world 
which shapes how the world is understood and how things are done [within] it” (Rose 2007: 142). 
Discourses are determined through analyses of verbal text as well as the practices that these texts ultimately 
produce and permit. According to Foucault, discourses are powerful in that they discipline individuals to 
adopt certain ways of thinking and acting, not in a top-down arrangement, but rather through producing 
human subjects through discourses themselves (Rose 2007: 143). Furthermore, discourses create not only 
the human subject, but also “objects, relations, places, [and scenes]” (Rose 2007: 143). Essentially, 
discourses ultimately create our entire understanding of the world. Through a Foucauldian discourse 
analysis of documentation, we can identify language and other signifying systems that are elements in 
forming and shaping realities and subjectivities, which in turn render reality governable (Rose et al. 2006: 
89). According to Foucault, because discourse permeates our entire reality, power is therefore everywhere 
as well. Where power is found there is also conflict or “a multiplicity of points of resistance” (Foucault 
1979: 95 as cited in Rose 2007: 143). Simply put, this means there are a variety of competing discourses 
present, which compete to construct reality as we know it. Therefore, in using a Foucauldian approach to 
discourse analysis in analyzing the Action Plan, this thesis is analyzing various texts to determine what 
institutions and governmentalities are influencing discourse. This thesis also determines how these 
discourses ultimately mediate our understanding of the world itself in terms of problematized behaviour as 
well as the appropriate remedies for such behaviour. Through identifying potential conflicting discourses, 
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this thesis determines how social actors ultimately construct security differently and how security comes to 
be constructed within the Action Plan itself. 
 According to Baker, Gabrielatos, Khosravinik, Krzyzanowski, Mcenery, and Wodak (2008), 
critical discourse analysis can essentially be understood as often focusing on theoretical concepts such as 
power, ideology, and domination. In turn, critical discourse analysis goes beyond simple analysis of the 
language within texts themselves and takes into account analysis of the social political, historical, and 
intertextual contexts found or implicit within the language (Baker et al. 2008: 273). Accordingly, 
[Critical discourse analysis] provides a general framework for problem-oriented social research. 
Every ‘text’ (e.g., an interview, focus group discussion, TV debate, press report, or visual symbol) 
is conceived as a semiotic entity, embedded in an immediate, text-internal co-text as well as 
intertextual and sociopolitical context (Baker et al. 2008: 279). 
 
Furthermore, critical discourse analysis is interested in analyzing “opaque as well as transparent structural 
relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control, as they are manifested in language” (Baker 
et al. 2008: 280). Fairclough (2003) however cautions that in using a Foucauldian method, social scientists 
often end up neglecting the linguistic features of texts entirely. Fairclough’s approach attempts to transcend 
this disjuncture by seeing discourse and linguistics not as antithetical concepts but rather as interrelated and 
essential to each other. Fairclough states,  
On the one hand, any analysis of texts which aims to be significant in social scientific terms has to 
connect with theoretical questions about discourse (e.g. the socially ‘constructive’ effects of 
discourse). On the other hand, no real understanding of the social effects of discourse is possible 
without looking closely at what happens when people talk or write (Fairclough 2003: 3). 
 
In keeping with the Foucauldian tradition of discourses analysis, this thesis recognizes that at least a cursory 
examination of text is necessary to identify discourses, loci of power, and so forth as posited by Fairclough 
(2003). 
 To analyze discourses to reach an understanding of the social construction(s) of security in regard 
to how various groups understand the Canada-United States Action Plan on Perimeter Security and 
Economic Competitiveness, various primary and secondary documents were examined. Sources include 
federal government and various independent organization websites; federal government and other 
publications; federal government official documents, including the international Action Plan itself; 
government and opposition discussions of the agreement from House of Commons Hansard Debates 
between February 2011 and February 2012; a random sample of approximately 35% of the 1000 unique 
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website submissions by individual Canadian citizens commenting on the agreement, furnished through 
Access to Information Requests filed with the Government of Canada for copies of submissions received 
between the March 13, 2011 launch of the online consultation website and Industry Canada’s receipt of the 
ATI request on September 19, 2011; as well as about 40 responses from businesses, business groups, labour 
unions, industry experts, independent NGOs, and key organizations including the Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association and the Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s office through both self-provision of 
documentation after email solicitation and through Access to Information Requests filed with the 
Government of Canada. These submissions were made in the form of letters and policy briefs to the 
Government of Canada through two separate solicitations for consultation both related to the Perimeter 
Security Action Plan: the February 4, 2011 creation of a Canada–United States Regulatory Cooperation 
Council (RCC) to simplify and align Canadian and American regulatory approaches, as well as the 
February 4, 2011 creation of a Canada-United States working group entitled Beyond the Border: A Shared 
Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness.  
To answer the key questions posited in this thesis, the discourse analysis of documents was coded 
consistent with the Foucauldian governmentality perspective. This coding was therefore “driven by the 
researcher’s theoretical or analytic interest” (Braun and Clarke 2006: 84). In keeping with the Foucauldian 
tradition and while seeking to answer the four research questions of this thesis, coding occurred at the latent 
level to move beyond semantics and instead focus on the governmentalities in the texts themselves. This 
also keeps with the constructionist orientation of the Foucauldian tradition in that this thesis is “examin[ing] 
the underlying ideas, assumptions, and conceptualizations… that are theorized as shaping or informing the 
semantic content of the data” (Braun and Clarke 2006: 84). Key themes were identified in individual texts 
first using an open coding method, and second using focused coding as posited by Emerson et al. (1995). 
Emerson et al. state, 
Qualitative analytic coding usually proceeds in two different phases. In open coding the 
[researcher] reads [texts] line-by-line to identify and formulate any and all ideas, themes, or issues 
they suggest, no matter how varied and disparate. In focused coding the [researcher] subjects 
[texts] to fine-grained, line-by-line analysis on the basis of topics that have been identified as of 
particular interest. Here, the [researcher] uses a smaller set of promising ideas and categories to 
provide the major topic and themes for the final [analysis] (Emerson et al. 1995 as cited in Babbie 
and Benaquisto 2002: 382). 
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Again, the results of the open coding process were reviewed through a process of focused coding shaped by 
theoretical discourse analysis to focus the results and relate findings to the four questions this thesis seeks to 
answer. 
After coding it was possible to address each of the four research questions. The first question 
regarding what specifically is being problematized through the international border security Action Plan 
was identified through different mentions of key targets of the program located in the policy itself, 
government websites, House of Commons questions from the opposition as well as responses by the 
government, as well as responses from individual Canadians and key stakeholders in the Action Plan. 
Question two regarding how the identified problematizations contribute to how security itself is constructed 
within the policy is logically connected to the first question and involved a comparison between all the 
identified problematized behaviours between all individuals involved in the consultation process with those 
“official” versions highlighted in government documents and in the Action Plan itself. Differences and 
similarities are discussed below and all individual constructions identified and highlighted. Responding to 
question three regarding what governmentality can be discerned shaping stakeholder constructions of 
security logically follows from the results of the first two questions. This involved taking all the collected 
texts on the Action Plan into consideration to discern the dominant rationality that is present. Question four 
regarding the broader implications for governmentality studies was answered by taking into consideration 

























 The results that follow highlight the constructions of security identified in submissions made by 
stakeholder groups to the BBWG. This section is divided into three subsections to assist in identifying 
between-group discourses while also highlighting key within-group discourses simultaneously. These three 
subsections are therefore categorized based on key characteristics (outlined below) that identify individual 
submissions as representative of and included in one of three stakeholder groups: business interest groups, 
individual Canadian citizens, and other interest groups. 
Business Interest Group Security Discourses 
 
Introduction to Business Interest Group Submissions 
 Approximately fifty-four business interest groups and ten independent businesses provided 
feedback to the BBWG. The criteria used in identifying business interest groups included: 1) that they 
primarily advocated directly on behalf of a business, a group of businesses, or represented an economic 
region primarily concerned with business-related activities; 2) they did not advocate directly on behalf of 
the Government of Canada or specific government agencies; 3) they did not primarily directly advocate on 
behalf of individual private citizens. Of the fifty-four identified business interest groups, submissions were 
acquired from twenty-seven groups, or 50% of the total submissions. Disappointingly, independent 
businesses were highly uncooperative in terms of emailing or otherwise providing their submissions. Of the 
ten businesses emailed, only one small private company provided documentation (the Wild Bird Trading 
Company). Of the larger corporations, three indicated they had no documentation to provide, one forwarded 
the email request to an internal department but then failed to reply further, and five did not respond to email 
requests in any way. None of the businesses posted any documentation related to the Action Plan on their 
website. Of the twenty-seven business interest groups from which submissions were acquired, twenty-six 
were business associations or groups representing multiple independent businesses, and one was a group 
representing an entire economic region of Canada.  
 Four discourses were identified through discourse analysis of business interest group submissions 
to the Beyond the Border Working Group: 1) the establishment of a more predictable border for supply 
chain management; 2) establishment of border security performance and efficacy metrics by the 
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Government of Canada; 3) greater state use of risk-management techniques to improve border practices and 
increase supply chain flow; and 4) the notion that voluntary participation in trusted-trader security programs 
with the Government of Canada and the United States should have tangible reward tradeoffs. Underlying 
these discourses was an overarching assumption that while security is important to ensuring business 
prosperity, security should not trump trade and the economy. In this respect, business interest groups often 
advocated for a “lesser of two evils” approach to security in order to promote trade and profit rather than 
stymie it. Security itself is therefore mostly portrayed as a need of the state that often conflicts with the need 
of individual businesses to increase profit. Each discourse – along with this overarching discourse – will be 
discussed below. 
1. Toward a More Predictable Border 
One frequently mentioned suggestion made in business interest group submissions to the BBWG 
was that the state should harmonize or otherwise eliminate policies that are perceived to negatively impact 
supply chain management.2 This often included requests for blanketed security in which the standards or 
procedures of security are constant regardless of the location of the search. For example, the Air Transport 
Association of Canada stated in their submission that, “There should be no different levels of security at 
airports versus land borders.” Similarly, the only individual private business	  acknowledged to have 
submitted to the BBWG – the Wild Bird Trading Company Ltd. of Newmarket, Ontario – expressed 
concerns that policies were not being administered equally between Canadian and U.S. goods crossing the 
border. The Wild Bird Trading Company Ltd. wrote in its submission, 
Part of the difficulty is the enforcement by the US Border service. They are very badly trained and 
often have difficulty determining which import policies apply and they refused to give written 
guidelines on products that are not specifically identified on any legislation [sic]. 
 
The Canadian Council of Chief Executives also commented on the need for harmonization in their 
submission:  
Streamlining the myriad rules and activities that impede the flow of legitimate cargo will improve 
security while at the same time enhancing the competitiveness of the U.S. and Canadian 
companies and lowering costs for both consumers and governments (p. 4).  
 
In the above examples – and in other similar submissions – the main concern is that state border security 
practices ultimately put industries – or specific companies – in positions of financial or other hardship when 
rules, laws, and practices are administered unequally. This type of submission suggested the great diversity 
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of state policies and procedures placed on trade often restrict the flow of goods across the border 
unnecessarily and that this hurts both the economy and security of North America. Therefore, harmonized 
security practices are presented in this case as a “lesser of two evils” approach in that they are perceived to 
allow for greater predictability in terms of business economic benefit while also allowing for enhanced 
security of the state.  Primarily, business interest groups therefore problematize non-harmonized security 
practices as antithetical to economic goals of businesses, and secondarily also antithetical to the security 
goals of the state in that non-harmonized policies have an element of chaos that makes blanketed uniform 
security impossible. Greater security in this discourse both in terms of business profitability and security of 
the state is therefore presented as best achieved through harmonized policies and practices. 
 Another frequent suggestion in several submissions was about harmonizing the numerous data 
reporting requirements to various agencies into “one single window.” In this approach, both the U.S. and 
Canadian governments – as well as all related government agencies – would share all required data from 
one submission database. For instance, Business for Better Borders (B3) – a bi-national coalition of 
manufacturing associations – stated in its submission,  
Most importantly must be implementing [sic] of a single window reporting process across all other 
government departments in Canada and other government agencies in the United States. 
Companies must be able to report all importation and exportation requirements electronically and 
through one source in each country. This would also support government needs for security as they 
would be able to view importation and exportation data holistically in order to make effective and 
efficient determinations of potential threats (p. 6).  
 
From the above quotation and in other submissions to the BBWG, it is apparent that businesses such as 
those represented by B3 indicate that the benefits of a single-window reporting process would be twofold: 
1) it would allow businesses to report all data to one place thus reducing the costs both in terms of data and 
human costs, and 2) this type of reporting would also support state risk management schemes toward 
security. Once again, current non-harmonized state border security practices – in this case data reporting 
requirements – are perceived to be antithetical to the business pursuit of profit and also the security needs of 
the state. A less-burdensome harmonized data reporting security practice is therefore advocated for in order 
to serve the dual interests mentioned above. Security is again presented as antithetical to capital 
accumulation and the need for a “lesser of two evils” approach to security is advocated for instead. 
Redundancy was also a major concern addressed in several business interest group submissions, 
mostly in the supply chain security process. Business interest groups referred to state-mandated security 
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procedures at shipping facilities as well as dual searches of the same shipment by customs officials on both 
sides of the border as unnecessary, time consuming, and adding extra costs not possible to calculate in 
advance in supply chain estimates. The Canadian Council of Chief Executives argued against redundant 
searches of goods crossing the Canada-U.S. border in its submission:  
Cargo arriving at a Canadian or U.S. port of entry from a third country should be inspected only 
once. Goods that pass inspection by a U.S. agent should not require re-inspection by a Canadian 
agent before crossing the border, and vice-versa… Any subsequent inspections for verification 
purposes should take place at the destination point, not at the border (p. 5). 
 
The Canadian International Freight Forwarders Association (CIFFA) echoed this concern and added that 
redundant container examinations “are costly, time consuming and drive uncertainty into the supply chain” 
(1). The Canadian Chamber of Commerce similarly submitted: 
Reducing processing overlap at many ports of entry would not only help to streamline operations 
but would also have a positive effect on operating costs… For example, a bag leaving Canada for 
the U.S. is first screened by Canadian officials and then rescreened by U.S. officials. Removing 
such redundancies and improving coordination between the relevant border agencies would not 
only allow agencies to work more cohesively to address security concerns but would also 
significantly improve the movement of people and goods at ports of entry (p. 10). 
 
The above quotations highlight how business interest groups problematize perceived redundant state border 
security inspection practices as mostly antithetical to the movement of people and goods at the border, and 
thus also the pursuit of profits lost via increased operation costs. Another less burdensome approach is 
advocated for in order to allow for businesses to increase profits and also support the security needs of the 
state – in this case through a “search once accept twice” procedure or by otherwise moving inspection 
processes away from the border. 
  Another common concern was movement of business personnel across the Canada-U.S. border. 
The Canadian Federation of Independent Business (CFIB) wrote  
…the rules regarding temporary movement of business people across borders – whether to sell 
products or deliver services – are more nuanced and in some cases subject to a great deal of 
interpretation (p. 3).  
 
The above quotation suggests that businesses seem to be generally intolerant of any unpredictable laws or 
regulations that inhibit the flow of international trade or business personnel across the border. This concern 
was echoed numerous times.  For example, B3 stated: 
Governments must strive to immediately introduce a coordinated and simplified border crossing 
processes for business travellers between the countries, including [efforts to] provide plan [sic] 
language detailed requirements to businesses, educate all officers on current requirements, [and] 
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eliminate visa requirements for Canada/U.S. citizens and permanent residents traveling for 
business purposes (p. 7). 
 
This statement by B3 seems to request a much more predictable interpretation of the laws and regulations 
governing business travellers across the border. There is also an implicit assumption that border officers are 
not properly trained to handle business travellers and that perhaps visa requirements should be completely 
removed instead. The Canadian Chamber of Commerce echoed this concern while requesting that 
governments add to the existing NEXUS system a provision that again would allow greater predictability in 
terms of business travellers crossing the border: 
While rules are in place governing entry requirements [for business travel], the growing red tape 
associated with temporary entry permits is an ongoing concern to businesses. The voluntary 
expansion of NEXUS to contain visa requirement information in its database would allow quick 
access by border agents to the necessary documentation for approval and verification. This would 
speed up processing times without reducing security (p. 6). 3 
 
The Pacific NorthWest Economic Region (PNWER) also echoed this request by asking for a “business 
Nexus program” (PNWER 2011: 11). In the aforementioned quotations state border security and 
immigration policies regarding the movement of business personnel are problematized in that they add 
direct costs to businesses and reduce the predictability of the movement of business personnel. Again, non-
standard state policies and practices are problematized as antithetical to the business pursuit of profit. There 
is also the subsequent request for a “lesser of two evils” approach to security whereby business traveller 
policies are harmonized and the NEXUS system is adapted to allow for more business predictability, 
lowering the costs associated with impeded business travel, and also maintaining the state need of security 
provision.  
 Submissions advocating for a more predictable border also often included calls for limitations on 
officer discretion at the border and the development of a more uniform approach to law and immigration 
enforcement. For example, in its formal submission to the BBWG, the Canadian Employee Relocation 
Council (CERC) discussed the results of a survey they administered to their membership. In its submission 
the CERC wrote,  
A theme throughout the survey, and one supported extensively by comments from participants, is 
the inconsistency that exists in decision making between border officials. As one participant 
commented, ‘Currently, it depends on the time of day, the border you cross and which border 
official you get as to how they interpret the rules.’ This creates frustration and unnecessary ‘red 
tape’ in the efficient movement of personnel… In exploring reasons for delays in processing entry 
applications, almost three quarters of participants cited inconsistent decision making by inspectors 
(p. 6). 
	   25 
 
The Canadian Federation of Independent Business (CFIB) echoed this same concern after interviewing 
member businesses,  
Finally, almost every person interviewed mentioned the inconsistency of border processes and the 
behaviour of some border officers. Since much is left to the discretion of an individual border 
officer, it can sometimes seem like a very arbitrary process… These types of actions may be 
absorbed more easily by larger firms… but for a small business this kind of experience can be 
devastating to their bottom line (p. 8).  
 
In both cases it is evident that inconsistent delivery of border security and immigration practices by officers 
– including when officers are appearing to use unrestricted discretion as opposed to discretionary decisions 
rooted in fixed policies – is a disruptive and costly practice in the opinion of businesses. Again, this leads to 
business concerns about predictability in that discretionary decisions are perceived to be generally 
unpredictable in terms of supply chain or business personnel management. Ultimately, business interest 
groups and the businesses they represent problematize unrestricted officer discretion as well as non-uniform 
state border security and immigration policies as antithetical to business goals and the pursuit of profit. 
More uniform discretionary decision-making is advocated for instead. 
Along the same line of thought, business interest groups also included comments about the 
perceived negative impact of random border exams. As with unrestricted officer discretionary decisions, 
random exams represent for business interest groups the definition of unpredictability in terms of supply 
chain and business personnel management. The Canadian Federation of Independent Business (CFIB) 
stated,  
Another very costly border procedure are random inspections, in which nothing is found, but for 
which the business is then charged fees ranging from $1500 to $2000 for offloading and 
warehousing of the goods (p. 8).  
 
In this quotation there is the dual sense that 1) random inspections are unpredictable and thus cost 
businesses fees that cannot possibly be factored into supply chain management calculations, and 2) random 
inspections are not achieving their presumed intended state security purpose anyway since “nothing is 
found”. This calls into question efficiency standards in terms of border security practices, which will be 
discussed in detail below. The Canadian Oilseed Processors Association wrote in its submission to the 
BBWG:  
Increasingly, shipments of protein meal destined for the U.S. livestock feed sector have become 
subject to random border testing… This has resulted in extensive cross-border shipping delays, 
costly interruption to commerce for both suppliers in Canada and customers in the U.S… 
	   26 
Estimates of the impact of this action on Canadian processors are a loss… of U.S. sales of 500 
thousand tonnes of protein meal worth $125 million (p. 1). 
 
This staggering claim of $125 million of commodity lost to random border inspections is again indicative of 
the business interest group belief regarding these specific practices – unpredictable border security and 
immigration techniques hurt companies and industries economically while providing very little (if any) 
benefit in terms of a security tradeoff. Again, the notion that border security practices should be predictable 
and that the state should allow private industry to more accurately predict supply chain management costs 
via reductions in random or otherwise unpredictable techniques is paramount in the submissions. In the 
above examples, random border examinations were also added to the list of problematized state border 
security actions. In this case, random examinations are portrayed as completely antithetical to the business 
pursuit of profit and to the state goal of security. As such, business interest groups do not advocate for a 
“lesser of two evils” approach as a potential solution. Instead, the complete removal of random 
examinations is advocated for. 
 Business interest groups also felt that greater predictability could be achieved if the government 
acted to increase the use of security and inspection processes away from the border. For instance, the 
Canadian Council of Chief Executives stated that, “Pre-clearance of shipments before they reach the border 
will strengthen our integrated supply chains, expedite commerce and increase efficiency” (p. 4). The 
Canadian Chamber of Commerce similarly stated,  
Many border processes can be accomplished just as efficiently offsite such as risk assessment and 
product health and safety inspections… Preclearance can also be conducted at processing and 
manufacturing facilities where goods are often sealed before arrival at the border. These goods 
could be inspected and sealed before being loaded on pre-cleared, sealed trucks. As well, truck, rail 
cars, and intermodal containers can be pre-cleared in bonded carrier facilities at trip origins. These 
trucks, rail cars and containers can be expedited across the border through prearrival [sic] 
notification that includes data on the shipment and if the seal is still intact (p. 8).  
  
The Canadian Oilseed Processors Association (COPA) echoed this suggestion in stating that random 
product examinations at the Canada-U.S. border should be stopped and that states should “Move all 
testing/sampling back to the plant of origin” (p. 3). The above statements are examples of several business 
interest group requests that inspections move away from the border for dual purposes: 1) moving searches 
away from the border could act to enhance security, 2) moving searches away from the border is perceived 
to increase efficiency of border practices as well as increase the flow of traffic. In this sense, business 
interest groups problematize state security inspections at the physical border that are perceived to introduce 
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uncertainty into the supply chain and create unnecessary costs for businesses, and instead advocate for off-
site inspections that are perceived to lower costs and increase the flow of traffic across the border while also 
allowing the state to achieve its security needs.  
 Regarding border security predictability overall, The Canadian Trucking Alliance released a 
statement in which president and CEO David Bradley summed up the potential hardships experienced by 
businesses as a result of unpredictable supply chain management at the border: 
We are hopeful this [Action Plan] process will lead to a better balance between security and trade 
initiatives… Canada and the United States, alone or in partnership cannot hope to compete with 
the emerging economies and/or other trading blocs, unless we have a predictable, reliable and 
efficient supply chain; the sheer enormity and overlap of the measures that have been imposed on 
cross-border trade over the past decade has not always been consistent with that imperative (CTA 
2011).  
 
In the above quotation there is the notion that state border security measures are antithetical to “trade 
initiatives” and the economic competitiveness of North America internationally. Throughout all the 
aforementioned business interest group submissions regarding border security predictability, it has been 
made apparent that business interest groups portray state border security practices as antithetical to the 
business need of increased profits and lower costs. The overwhelming notion present in these submissions 
is that businesses in Canada and the United States rely directly on “predictable, reliable and efficient” 
supply chains, again predicated on the notion that Canada and the United States need to make it easier on 
private industry to conduct supply chain management by making security practices uniform and predictable. 
As such, unpredictable border security practices initiated by governments are problematized specifically 
because they are perceived to deny private businesses the ability to fully control and predict supply chain 
management and thus also costs. Business interest groups often advocated for states to use border security 
techniques that are less-impactful economically and also more predictable from a business standpoint in 
order to serve the dual goal of increasing business profitability and also still meeting the state need for 
security. In a few of the aforementioned quotations there was also the implicit assumption present that 
perhaps state border security practices can therefore be measured in terms of efficiencies in order to meet 
these goals. The request for performance and efficiency measures will be brought to light below. 
2. Performance and Efficiency Metrics of Border Security 
 Business interest groups often stated that states should be reaching certain benchmarks or 
performance indicators consistent with business-based metrics found in the economic world. For instance, 
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the Canadian Council of Chief Executives advocated in its submission for “Establishment of time-specific 
benchmarks for transiting each border point/port” (p. 4). The establishment of firm time-related benchmarks 
at the border is perceived to allow businesses to more accurately predict border-crossing times for supply 
chain management purposes. The Canadian Chamber of Commerce in its joint submission with the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce to the BBWG stated,  
A temporary cabinet-level border subcommittee should be created and specifically empowered to 
review border processes and streamline operations where possible… To understand how to 
improve the efficiency of the border, we must first have an excellent understanding of existing 
border operations. The cabinet subcommittee should also spearhead the development and 
centralization of border related metrics and serve to monitor progress of efforts to improve the 
efficiency and security of the border (p. 2).  
 
This suggestion implies that the state can develop metrics to monitor and improve levels of efficiency and 
security at the border. Efficiency inherently implies that security itself can be subject to performance 
measurements in the interest of streamlining border inspections and associated processes as well as meeting 
the state need for security. A similar submission by the Public Border Operators Association (PBOA) stated 
that states should  
Recognize that the border can only work as well as it is managed by CBP and CBSA. 
Infrastructure improvements are meaningless if the human resources are not in place to utilize 
them. Ensuring that inspection booths are appropriately staffed and scheduled to accommodate 
traffic demands is critical to a well functioning border… (p. 2). 
 
Again, there is the suggestion that the state needs to accommodate private industry and make border 
crossing more predictable by implementing performance measurements and metrics to ensure that border 
security is optimally reaching its goals in a way that does not adversely affect trade and the economy. In the 
aforementioned quotations – and in other similar submissions – the fact that state border security is 
currently not subject to performance, efficiency, and other metrics is problematized as contributing to 
greater inefficiency, lower predictability, and added supply chain costs that ultimately undermine business 
goals. Again, state security techniques are portrayed as antithetical to the goals of business and the 
routinization of metrics is offered as a potential solution to increase business profitability while also 
meeting the state need for security. 
3. Emphasizing Risk Management 
Business interest groups, as mentioned above, demand the state use the principles of “risk-
management” more efficiently to allow for the flow of so-called legitimate goods and people across the 
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border. For example, the Air Transport Association of Canada stated that there exists a necessity to “Agree 
on a reasonable (not 100%) screening of Air Cargo level” (1). This implies of course that examination of all 
cargo is not reasonable to ensure security and that therefore an acceptable level of risk-based assessments 
needs to be used instead. Business for Better Borders (B3) provided a submission that centered its 
suggestion for border security on the notion of risk: 
Specifically, we believe the priority for the BBWG should be to create a harmonized system of 
border operations between the countries that separates traffic and their reporting requirements at 
the border into three distinct types based on the levels of investment by companies and the 
advanced knowledge and information of those companies that governments have (p. 2). 
 
The B3 suggestion is a risk-based submission that advocates for differential levels of risk and security based 
on individual company input into voluntary state security programs. In essence, B3 advocates that those 
who invest the most into such programs should receive unimpeded flow at the border, those who supply a 
medium range of information should receive quicker passage at the border (but still would be subject to 
inspection), and those who have not invested should provide plenty of information before arriving so as to 
speed up the process for all those who have invested. Again, implicit in these levels of risk is the notion that 
border security (particularly risk levels) should be predictable for the private sector businesses involved in 
state initiated voluntary security programs. The Canadian Chamber of Commerce in its joint submission 
with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to the BBWG similarly stated, “It is imperative that the Canada-U.S. 
border separate ‘trusted’ trade and travel from high-risk goods and people. Over the years various programs 
have been developed with this in mind, however, unnecessary overlap is eroding many of the potential 
benefits” (p. 3). The Chamber’s submission also argues for risk predictability in harmonizing risk-based 
programs to ensure benefits are truly being provided to those in voluntary state security programs. The 
Chamber’s submission also seems to suggest that there needs to be a concerted effort on the part of the state 
to actively “separate” those people who are non-risky from those people who are high-risk, and target 
security practices accordingly. The Tourism Industry Association of Canada (TIAC) in its joint submission 
with the U.S. Travel Association to the BBWG provides a summary of the business interest group advocacy 
for risk-based practices while also calling for unencumbered travel across the Canada/U.S. border. The 
TIAC states,  
Now more than ever we need to ensure a risk management framework at our borders that enables 
economic growth at the same time as it ensures security. Ultimately, traffic should flow between 
Canada and the United States as easily as it does in the European Union (p. 1). 
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In a sense, for many business interest groups, it is a standard suggestion across submissions that risk-based 
practices will ultimately help relieve current non-predictable state security practices at the border, which 
will ultimately help move traffic quicker and thus also help improve the North American economy and also 
the business pursuit of profit. Risk practices are portrayed as having a dual benefit in these submissions, 
serving both a security-based function and an economic function ultimately leading to mutual benefit 
between private industry and the state. In this sense, risk practices are routinized as a “lesser of two evils” 
approach much more favourable to business interests when compared to border security practices that do 
not use risk profiling. State border security techniques that are not predicated on the notion of risk are 
therefore problematized as antithetical to the business pursuit of profit, the economic growth of North 
America, and the state need for security given that techniques not involving risk are perceived to introduce 
chaos in terms of security provision.  
4. Rewards for Private Partners in Public Security 
 Lastly, along the same vein as risk-management approaches, business interest groups also 
regularly advocated that voluntary participation in trusted-trader security programs with Canada and the 
United States should involve tangible rewards for businesses. This especially included the request that such 
businesses receive decreased levels of security inspections at the border in reward of their participation. In 
this sense, business interest groups often advocated for predictable rewards when participating in state 
sponsored risk-based programs. The Canadian Society of Customs Brokers (CSCB) in its submission wrote:  
…underutilization of FAST lanes at specific border points indicates an opportunity that should not 
be missed. Why not allow Trusted Traders access to those lanes? This is… about providing a 
benefit to [Partners in Protection] participants who at this time would welcome a benefit of any 
kind. Programs without benefits have questionable futures and allowing PIP participants access to 
FAST lanes is a relatively simple way of establishing a demonstrable benefit to current and 
potential program participants. The efficiencies to be gained by re-routing of carriers at the land 
border to open lanes should be actively considered (p. 1).  
 
This suggestion obviously is very firm in stating that voluntary risk-based programs instituted by states will 
only have effective participation if business interest groups are offered clear tangible benefits in return. In 
the above quote, the CSCB is advocating that members of the Partners in Protection (PIP) program be 
allowed to use existing Free and Secure Trade (FAST) lanes in order to increase border crossing efficiency 
and provide a demonstrable direct benefit to participants in terms of lowered border inspection rates.4 5 The 
Canadian Chamber of Commerce in its joint submission again echoed these concerns, writing,  
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Unfortunately, participation in these [trusted trader] programs can be difficult, the costs remain 
high and the benefits can be limited. For example, certification as a trusted shipper can take years 
and cost hundreds of thousands of dollars in upfront costs. In the long term, continued compliance 
in these programs often requires oversight by dedicated staff. To make matters worse, despite 
paying for memberships in multiple programs, companies are still subjected to costly inspections. 
In one instance a company reported having to pay over $1 million because of increased security 
measures, participation dues and border fees (p. 4).  
 
The Chamber’s submission highlights the implied notion that through a cost-benefit analysis, the benefits of 
trusted trader programs should outweigh the costs of such programs.  
 These submissions regarding benefits for businesses also included requests that the state afford 
businesses unimpeded flow and movement at the border. For instance, the Canadian Manufacturing 
Coalition (CMC) stated that there needs to be a focus on the part of the state to improve and expand trusted 
trader programs, and that this should include “Non-stop movement of fully qualified and secured (CSA and 
PIP/C-TPAT) shipments across the border” (p. 1). Business for Better Borders (B3) advocated for 
immediate release at the border when trucks meet three key characteristics – a FAST registered driver, a 
registered importer, and a registered carrier – as well as, “Non-stop movement of fully qualified and 
secured shipments across the border” (p. 5). In this sense, business interest groups problematize state 
sponsored voluntary trusted trader programs that do not have tangible benefits for businesses and therefore 
create a situation in which costs of membership and participation are not outweighed by potential benefits. 
Again, state border security techniques are problematized in that they are antithetical to the business need to 
increase profits and lower costs. As such, a “lesser of two evils” approach is offered as a solution in order to 
provide direct financial and cost-savings benefits to businesses while also allowing the state to continue its 
voluntary trusted trader programs to meet the state need for security. 
Business Interest Groups Summary 
 Underlying all the aforementioned submissions regarding harmonizing and eliminating 
economically damaging policies, moving toward a more predictable border, emphasizing risk-management 
techniques, achieving rewards for private partners in public security, moving border security away from the 
border, and the installation of performance and efficiency metrics of border security, is the overarching 
assumption amongst business interest groups that while security is important to ensuring prosperity, 
security should not trump trade, business profit potentials, and the economy. In essence, security is 
portrayed as a need of the state that often does not coincide with the needs of businesses to increase profits, 
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lower consumer costs, and contribute to the North American economy. The primary concern of those in the 
business field is security of profit potential juxtaposed against the border security needs of the state. As 
exemplified above and found in several other submissions to the BBWG, business interest group 
submissions regarding border security and border security techniques are frequently coupled with demands 
that the security needs of the state not infringe on or impose barriers to the capacity of private industry to 
conduct trade and improve profit potential.  
Individual Canadian Citizen Security Discourses 
Introduction to Individual Canadian Citizen Submissions 
 Through Access to Information Requests filed with Industry Canada the Government of Canada 
furnished about 450 pages of individual Canadian citizen submissions. While most responses were confined 
to one page, some citizens did have lengthier comments. About 432 individual responses were received 
from the Government of Canada.6 Of these, a systematic random sample of 360 was examined by taking 
five out of every six responses to represent a 36% sample of the total population of responses of 1000 
individuals. Of the sample of 360, two were excluded because they were written in French, one was 
excluded because it contained a question to state officials and not a comment on the Action Plan, and two 
were excluded because the nature of the content of the submissions was not related to the Action Plan. This 
resulted in a sample of 355 individual citizen responses for analysis. 
 Citizen submissions to the BBWG generally focused on four key discourses: 1) the “law abiding 
citizen appeal”; 2) The perils of Canada-U.S. collaboration; 3) human rights discourse; and 4) combating 
illegal immigration and fraudulent refugees. Individual Canadian citizen submissions often constructed 
security as a state need that is antithetical to certain identified key discourses in terms of freedom of 
mobility of law-abiding people, human rights, Canadian security, and immigration enforcement. 
1. The Law-Abiding Citizen Appeal 
 The most frequent discourse generated by the sample of individual Canadian citizen submissions 
to the BBWG is what can be referred to as a “law-abiding citizen appeal”. In this sense, Canadians 
frequently indicated that customs agencies in both Canada and the United States should be focusing on 
“criminals” and “terrorists”, and thus not needlessly targeting innocent individuals. This is most accurately 
referred to as a law-abiding citizen appeal given that the “average Canadian citizen” is contrasted with the 
	   33 
“criminal other”, or perhaps what may be referred to as a “law-breaking citizen”. In this sense, border 
security practices that are perceived to needlessly target or otherwise inconvenience law-abiding citizens 
are problematized because of the dual sense that: 1) the state is inhibiting the flow of law-abiding citizens 
that ought to be afforded freedom of mobility due to their law-abiding nature; and 2) the state should be 
instead focusing all of its attention on law-breaking citizens in order to provide security for all. 
Occasionally such practices were also problematized because of their perceived antithetical relationship to 
the economic competitiveness of North America. The use of risk-based practices as well as technology are 
offered as potential solutions to achieve the task of separating the law-abiding citizen from the law-breaking 
citizen and also allowing for the free flow of legitimate trade and travel across the border. 
 These notions were presented in several ways across submissions. Firstly, citizens were opposed to 
border security practices identified as intrusive and needless given the self-concept label of “law-abiding 
citizen”. Citizen 0153 suggests,  
Do more profiling to speed up the lines. I’ve seen to [sic] many times where non-threatening 
citizens (little old ladies) are treated like they want to blow up the world. Pick who you think is 
more of a threat and focus on them.  
 
Here we see a direct contrast between law-abiding citizens portrayed as “little old ladies” and those who 
actually would “want to blow up the world”. Moving beyond the “little old lady” portrayal, citizen 0239 
stated,  
I’m not sure of the stats, but certainly the majority of people crossing the border are not criminals, 
a security risk or breaking the law. Bottom line is that Border Services has to get smarter without 
hindering the public or stopping every fifth car for a complete top to bottom search… The most 
important thing to maintain in this is the FREEDOM of Canadians to travel. That we are innocent 
and should be treated with respect. No amount of security should take that away. 
 
In the above quotation there is the suggestion that the majority of people are law-abiding citizens and that 
therefore the majority of people should not be subjected to border searches. There is also the appeal that 
states should be focusing their security practices on only those who are in fact criminals or who pose a 
direct security threat. Citizen 0156 offered a potential solution, submitting,  
I believe that more people need to do the in-car interrogation more quickly – and send cars with 
suspicious people inside for further investigation… Perhaps officers could pre screen [sic] some 
vehicles waiting in line and tag suspicious vehicles. 
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As is the case in each of the aforementioned submissions, in this one there is the notion that efforts must be 
made to identify those who are a security risk or a law-breaking citizen and who would do harm while 
simultaneously also not subjecting law-abiding citizens to border security-related practices.  
 Secondly, Canadians often noted that at the border, security-related practices entailed being treated 
like a terrorist or a criminal instead of how they personally defined themselves – as innocent members of 
the traveling public. Citizen 0013 copied an email from a third party about a border experience in which an 
artist was denied entry to the United States at the border, finger printed, photographed, had their car and 
possessions searched, and was then escorted back to the Canadian border by a patrol car with its top 
lightbar flashing. The email then went on to say, “There is something very wrong here, when a person 
trying to cooperate with border regulations is treated as a criminal.” Here, the artist was portrayed as 
innocent and as complying fully with border regulations and therefore not deserving of the enforcement 
actions of the U.S. border officials. Citizen 0117 stated,  
If someone traveling to the U.S. or Canada via air/automobile has to be scrutinized like a rat in a 
lab, less travel will occur… The current security measures makes one feel more like a terrorist than 
welcomed guest. The security measures now do not work properly.  
 
This citizen’s submission supports the notion that innocent travelers should not be treated like terrorists 
when traveling in North America. Furthermore, the citizen regards border security practices as antithetical 
to the economic competitiveness of North America given that such practices are perceived to ultimately 
lead to less cross-border travel. The citizen also asserts that such practices do nothing to increase security. 
Citizen 0216 similarly highlighted another area of perceived concern regarding  
Courtesy of the Border Officers, especially on the U.S. side. Perhaps a course in human relations 
would help. We see ourselves as clients of the Bridge Authority and have [NEXUS] Cards. Yet we 
are often treated with suspicion and rudeness. We have spotless records as travellers into the U.S. 
Surely, the information about us stored in the computer should indicate this… The majority of 
people crossing the [Sault Ste. Marie International] Bridge are not criminals or terrorists. Treat us 
as guests in your country, not undesirables. 
 
 Thirdly, Canadians often appealed to the perceived innocence of their intended activity in the 
United States as prima facie evidence that they were law-abiding citizens and that they should therefore not 
be subjected to border security practices. Citizen 0070 for example wrote,  
I would like to please speed the processes up for border crossing. I understand the need for 
increased border security… I enjoy going to hockey, baseball, football and concerts [portion 
blacked out under s. 19(1) of the Access to Information Act]. However, I have been doing this less 
and less with each crossing. I do not want to leave 3 hours prior to an event to endure long 
searches at the border… If you want to improve tourism at the border crossings… going to… and 
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coming [portion blacked out under s. 19(1) of the Access to Information Act] then please do 
something. 
 
In this quote, the citizen appealed to the notion that going to sporting venues and concerts does not warrant 
border searches that delay crossing the border. In this sense, “pleasure” visits to the United States are 
portrayed as harmless and law-abiding. This citizen also echoed the submission from citizen 0117 in 
portraying border security practices as antithetical to the perceived economic goal to improve tourism in 
North America. Citizen 0152 stated, “Have the border guards on both sides focus on those who are actually 
[a] risk versus those who are just there to spend money or have a vacation.” Citizen 0236 echoed this 
submission in stating,  
I believe the threats are already known before hand in most cases. It seems that the ‘people’ in 
charge of this information keep it to them selves [sic]. In most cases the ‘suspects’ are not your 
average Canadian going on a holiday.   
 
In the above two quotes there is the notion that those who are “just” vacationing or “just” shopping in the 
United States do not pose any threat whatsoever given that both activities are lawful. Citizen 0175 also 
submitted,  
I would like to see the role of customs and immigration agents redefined – eliminating low level 
responsibilities such as sales tax collection and quizzing me over my lunch, which creates 
unnecessary delays when crossing the border – and instead have them focused on true concerns 
relating to security of both countries (immigration, drugs, weapons, terrorism, human trafficking, 
etc.).  
 
Here again is the notion that shopping or having lunch in the United States is not worthy of border officer 
attention, and that instead officers should be focusing on the “true concerns” highlighted above. 
 Fourthly, Canadians often appealed to the fact that they are Canadian citizens as prima facie 
evidence that they do not have nefarious purposes and thus should not be subjected to border security 
practices.  For example, citizen 0190 wrote,  
I nevertheless feel that some kind of ‘risk’ profiling could be employed to reduce the considerable 
wasted time and money spent going through security… [portion blacked out under s. 19(1) of the 
Access to Information Act], born, raised and have only lived in Canada all our lives. The odds of 
people like ourselves being security risks are probably something more than a million to one. 
Could we not be issued a special card and have a separate line for any required security check? 
 
In the above quote, the citizen advocated for special cards and separate primary inspection lines for 
Canadian citizens because of the notion that the risk that someone born in and living in Canada is up to 
criminal or other risky activities is projected to be “a million to one”. Citizen 0182 stated, 
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I have no problem sharing my personal information with the U.S. government… They should 
know if I have a criminal record or any affiliations with groups that could be considered a threat to 
their country… I do have a problem with the treatment Canadians receive from U.S. border and 
customs officials at the two Windsor/Detroit crossings… The U.S. customs and border agents are 
rude and intimidating in appearance and conduct… For a country that declares itself as champions 
of justice and the land of the free, they apparently feel their closest neighbours should have no 
rights or courtesy when entering their territory.  
 
Here it is apparent the citizen portrayed U.S. CBP officers as essentially denying Canadians rights and 
courtesy at the border needlessly, and that implicitly Canadians should have enough credibility as the 
United States’ closest neighbor to be entitled to some degree of rights and courtesy when crossing the 
border. In this sense, current state border security practices are portrayed as antithetical to the maintenance 
of human rights so proudly touted by both states. This quotation, while illustrative of the notion that 
Canadians are not threats to the United States, also sheds light on a discourse surrounding human rights that 
will be elaborated on further below. 
 Fifth, even when Canadian citizens admitted to not being the stereotypical law-abiding citizen, 
they still invoked the law-abiding citizen appeal in stating that the United States and Canada should have 
differential levels of enforcement based on the severity of previous criminal history, where some criminal 
offences were portrayed as not nearly as severe (and therefore worthy of exclusionary enforcement 
activities) as other offences. For example, citizen 0293 stated,  
I would suggest that the United States review their ‘no entry’ policy to differentiate between 
people likely to reoffend and possibly break a law while visiting their country and people with old 
criminal records who are unlikely to break the law.  
 
Here, a differentiation is made between those with old criminal records who are perceived to be “unlikely to 
break the law”, and those with more current records who are apparently more likely to reoffend while 
visiting the United States. Citizen 0325 similarly suggested,  
Currently anyone with any kind of criminal record cannot enter Canada, and cannot gain 
permanent residency, even through marriage or relation. For example, someone with a DUI no 
matter how old or severe cannot enter Canada for any purpose… This is an incredible drain on 
financial resources and tax revenue with little or no benefits to the Canadian people… People 
should only be denied entrance to Canada if they are restricted travel by their respective gov’t [sic] 
or deemed violent/repeat offenders.  
 
Here, the citizen’s submission advocated for a differentiation between supposedly more serious offenders 
(those restricted by their own government or violent and repeat offenders) versus those who commit 
perceived less-serious crimes like DUIs. 7 In this quotation there is also the notion that such border security 
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practices are antithetical to the economic competitiveness of North America given that the costs of 
enforcement are perceived to be high with little or no direct benefits in return. 
 Lastly, citizens also appealed to technology as an infallible method for separating the law-abiding 
citizen from the law-breaking citizen. Biometrics was often advocated for in this respect. Citizen 0149 
stated,  
I… was granted a FAST card a few years ago. In order for the granting process to be completed I 
was… also finger printed and eye scanned. This I have no problem with whatsoever. I think it 
would be a great idea for all those being granted a passport to follow the same procedure; 
especially the eye scanning… I may be wrong, but I know of no means by which a person’s eye 
can be altered; not so with fingerprinting. 
 
This citizen appeals to the apparent impossibility for individuals to alter their biological markers as 
evidence that iris scanning could provide an infallible security technology for North America. Citizen 0341 
likewise wrote,  
I hope that the canadian and american govt’s [sic] can come together and create a biometrical 
system using passports or other forms of biometrical ID… I believe this would reduce illegal entry 
by individuals coming to canada or the us [sic] on tourist and student visas and smuggling 
themselves into our countries when there [sic] visas expire and not bothering to return home.  
 
Here, biometrics is presented as an infallible technology to control immigration overstays in Canada and the 
United States. Security is basically constructed in this discourse as technology itself given that technology 
is perceived to be infallible. Much like the “CSI effect” in which the importance of scientific evidence is 
overemphasized and presented as irrefutable, technology is presented in much the same overemphasized 
way as the way to ensure security in an infallible manner. 8 While many individual Canadian citizen 
submissions were generally opposed to the greater use of biometrics, several submissions did advocate 
nonetheless for the increased use of specific or non-specified “technologies” in order to separate law-
abiding citizens from law-breaking citizens.  
 Overall the aforementioned quotations and other similar submissions problematize border security 
practices that are perceived to needlessly target or otherwise inconvenience law-abiding citizens. The 
border security practices of the state are portrayed to be inhibiting the flow of law-abiding citizens that 
ought to be afforded freedom of mobility due to their law-abiding nature. Furthermore, there is the notion 
presented by individual citizens that the state should be instead focusing all of its attention on law-breaking 
citizens in order to provide security for all. Occasionally such practices were also problematized because of 
their perceived antithetical relationship to the economic competitiveness of North America. The use of risk-
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based practices as well as technology were offered as potential solutions to achieve the task of separating 
the law-abiding citizen from the law breaking citizen and also allowing for the free flow of legitimate trade 
and travel across the border. 
2. The Perils of Canada-U.S. Collaboration 
 Several Canadian citizens also maintained that further collaboration with the United States 
regarding security was a greater threat to Canada and Canadians than if Canada remained independent in its 
pursuit of security. This often included the belief that colluding with the United States would put Canada at 
a greater risk of a terrorist attack for a variety of reasons. Canadian citizens often cited the perceived 
intrusive and aggressive foreign affairs record of the United States as prima facie evidence that colluding 
with the United States would increase the risk of terrorist actions against Canada. For example, citizen 0189 
stated,  
Canada currently, though rapidly swinging in that direction, does not have the horrendously flawed 
and blood stained foreign affairs track record that the U.S. unabashedly holds. Such mistreatment 
of our fellow man [sic] has led to a growing number of enemies around the world angry at the 
U.S., and I believe that Canada should not have to bear this same burden under [any] circumstance. 
 
Citizen 0096 explicitly highlighted the notion that further integration with the United States would put 
Canada at a higher risk of a terrorist attack due to U.S. activities:  
The biggest threat to Canada IS the United States. Until they rout out the corruption that is a 
hallmark of their monetary system, financial system and their foreign policy, we would be best to 
distance ourselves from them. We are inviting terrorist attacks by serving alongside the US in 
[two] illegal occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
Citizen 0289 agreed with this sentiment, submitting,  
First off, I would suggest that the United States has a very aggressive foreign policy which has 
included interference in many other foreign countries around the world, which is the reason that 
they are a target for terrorism… and I believe that we are putting ourselves at risk by aligning 
Canada’s foreign and domestic policies with the U.S. 
 
In this respect, further Canadian security collaboration with the United States is problematized in individual 
Canadian citizen submissions to the BBWG due to the notion that perceived negative worldwide opinions 
of aggressive U.S. foreign policy practices will ultimately put Canada at a greater risk of a terrorist attack as 
a result. Canadians instead frequently advocated for the Canadian state to remain autonomous in its pursuit 
of security to avoid the potential increased risk of terrorist attacks. 
 Canadians also frequently cited NAFTA as an example of a previous agreement that did not end up 
reflecting Canadian interests, and as direct evidence that Canada should not be entering into another 
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economic or security pact with the United States.9 This unfolded in two ways. Firstly, Canadians often 
stated that NAFTA ultimately did nothing to benefit Canadians generally. For instance, citizen 0015 stated,  
In support of trade and economic growth I suggest you try to recover some of the manufacturing 
capability exported offshore under the [North American] Free Trade Agreement… Lastly you 
might try to recognize that your programme of emphasizing trade in order to support U.S. security 
is a flimsy cover for the U.S. initiative to integrate the two economies within a common perimeter.  
 
The narrative that manufacturing was a major casualty of NAFTA and that Canada suffered as a result was 
a repeated theme. For instance, Citizen 0075 wrote,  
My example is free trade. The prices in Canada remain much higher than US prices even though 
our dollar is at par. Free trade initiated a huge export of manufacturers to other countries where 
production costs are lower but our prices remain high. 
 
In this sense, Canadian citizens problematized economic arrangements such as NAFTA and argued that 
they cost Canadians jobs and also ultimately hurt the Canadian economy. Again, as was the case in the 
increased risk of terrorist attack discourse mentioned above, Canadians often advocated that Canada remain 
autonomous in its pursuit of economic competitiveness. 
 Canadians also commonly stated that NAFTA was an example of a direct circumstance in which 
the United States had taken the lead on a collaboration in the past for their own intrinsic reasons, and thus 
also an example of the United States completely disregarding the views of Canadians in turn. Citizen 0026 
stated, “I would like to see [an] end to Free trade [sic] and have my country back the way it was before 
Mulroney sold out to the big American corporate interests.” In this sense, corporate interests are 
problematized as corrupting national economics and not providing any tangible benefit to individual 
citizens. Citizen 0201 chose to highlight how the U.S. specifically used NAFTA as leverage to undermine 
Canadian interests:   
We ARE secure as long as we are the masters of our own affairs, which means our present borders 
should remain as they are! We have seen NAFTA working only in one direction. May I remind 
you of the years of fighting corporate USA in our soft wood lumber disputes, where Canada was 
found to have a legitimate case repeatedly, but corporate america [sic] did not abide by the rulings 
and we lost billions.  
 
In this sense, any further collusion with the United States on economic or joint border security 
arrangements seems ill advised given previous NAFTA-related disputes such as in the case of soft wood 
lumber. U.S. corporate interests seem to reign supreme in such arrangements with little concern for the 
welfare of private citizens (especially Canadian citizens). Citizen 0336 echoed this concern and provided 
NAFTA as an example of the United States’ unwillingness to abide by its own agreements:   
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Although we often have common interests, the United States has demonstrated quite often that 
they are not willing to abide by any agreements if they feel it is not in their best interest to do so. I 
see no difference between this proposal and NAFTA which they have flagrantly abused and 
ignored in the past. 
 
While economic arrangements form a key problematized behaviour for Canadian citizens, NAFTA is used 
as an example of why Canada is ill advised to enter upon any further agreements with the United States of 
America. This is protracted of course onto the entire Action Plan on Perimeter Security and Economic 
Competitiveness (and not just the economic portion). As such, economic cautionary tales serve as direct 
evidence in citizen submissions that Canada should not be entering in any further security collaboration 
with the United States as well. 
 The above quotations highlight how many individual Canadian citizen submissions to the BBWG 
indicate that further collaboration and association with the United States will only serve to put Canada at a 
greater security risk – especially from terrorists – but also in terms of a negative impact on the Canadian 
economy. In this sense, while some Canadians chose to highlight exclusively the perceived security risk to 
Canada of further collaboration with the United States, others portrayed security and the economy as 
inseparable from each other and thus the perceived risks of economic collaboration can also be protracted 
directly onto security collaboration. Overall, Canadian citizens directly problematize further collaboration 
with the United States and see such collaboration as a greater security risk than sovereign or independent 
security provision. 
3. Human Rights Discourse 
 Another common discourse among individual Canadian citizen submissions was that new border 
security procedures are eroding human rights, privacy, freedoms, and democracy and that steps need to be 
taken to ensure that such inalienable constitutional and legal limitations on state actions are preserved for all 
Canadians. Citizens in opposition to the Action Plan frequently employed human rights-based concerns. For 
example, citizen 0032 stated,  
Bio passports, finger prints, iris scans, cameras all over the place… I am sure that some grandma 
and grandpa will be tasered [sic] soon for no reason at all. Maybe some cars taken apart at the 
owners [sic] cost… We are not cattle – we claim to be humans. 
 
There is the notion here that people are dehumanized as a result of electronic and other enforcement actions, 
in this quotation treated like cattle. Citizen 0106 was equally concerned about information sharing activities 
and likened it to spying:  
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I am very fearful of this idea. You are literally proposing to increase monitoring, that is, spying, on 
citizens of each country. As with other investigations, all monitoring should require judicial 
approval for individual instance [sic]. Its [sic] bad enough that the mounties [sic] keep tabs on 
politicians and [that] civil servants feel free to use privileged information to attack people. 
 
This citizen also calls for some sort of judicial oversight of information sharing that would theoretically 
ensure the rights of Canadian citizens are protected. Citizen 0319 submitted,  
The existing data base [sic] on travellers in the US is generally politically biased. It seems that 
anyone in authority can add a person’s name to the list and the affected person has no recourse. It 
is nearly impossible to remove a name from the list regardless of that person’s guilt or innocence.  
 
This citizen highlighted U.S. watch lists as a potential violation of Canadian citizens’ legal rights given that 
there is no legal recourse whatsoever to assist in getting a name off a particular list. Citizen 0272 stated,  
Any agreement between our nations must not compromise Canadian sovereignty, the rights of 
Canadians, including our freedoms. Therefore, we should not have an ‘open border’ with the 
Americans. And we should not continue to give up our freedoms in the name of security.  
 
This quotation provides a summary of similar submissions made by individual Canadian citizens that 
problematize state border security as antithetical to the rights and freedoms of Canadians. This discourse is 
very similar to the “security as illiberalism” discourse offered by Roach (2003), Amoore (2006), Welch 
(2007), Hudson (2009) and O’Malley (2010) as described in the literature review section of this thesis. 
Security in this discourse is portrayed as only reflecting the security needs of states while completely 
disregarding the rights and freedoms of citizens.  
  Privacy-based language was also used in order to oppose the Action Plan. Citizen 0095 advocated 
for the privacy of Canadian citizens while opposing information sharing with other nations in writing,  
It is important for both countries to share information on perceived threats to actual security. 
HOWEVER – In no way should Canada permit monitoring of the communication of the citizens of 
Canada by it’s [sic] own agencies nor those of it’s [sic] neighbor the USA etc.  
 
Some citizens highlighted the need for proactive disclosure to individual citizens of the reasons why their 
information needs to be shared with the United States. Citizen 0128 for instance stated,  
Personal information is a very valuable commodity which US government [sic] actively seeks to 
obtain. The value and monetary cost of personal information is not fully recognized. Moreover, the 
accumulation of such information is prone to abuse, theft and etc. [sic] It must be the right of every 
citizen to know for what purpose, when and who has accessed their personal information stored by 
any government.  
 
There is also the notion here that sharing information with the United States could leave Canadians’ 
information prone to abuse and theft. Citizen 0238 echoed this concern in stating,  
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With respect to exchanging information I feel that my privacy would be violated, I like many 
Canadians do not trust the US to handle that information correctly and my or other persons’ 
personal information could be leaked.  
 
 Citizen 0336 continued with requesting that the intent of information sharing be disclosed to Canadians: 
For this reason I believe that the privacy of Canadian citizens must be paramount when it comes to 
sharing personal information with the Americans. It should never be done unless the Canadian 
Citizen in question has been informed of the intent to do so and given the opportunity to object to 
the release of their personal information… I believe any agreement on the release of personal 
information to ANY U.S. agency by any Canadian agency [must] have this protection at its core.  
 
In the above quotation, legal recourse is again requested as a mechanism for opposing sharing of any 
specific information with the United States. In the above quotations there is the overwhelming sense that 
sharing information with the United States would violate Canadian citizen rights and that information 
would be abused or unjustly shared by the United States without legal recourse. As such, individual 
Canadian citizens problematize unrestricted information sharing with the United States as part of state 
border security practices because it is perceived to be antithetical to the privacy rights of Canadians. This 
again coincides with the security as illiberalism discourse identified above. Potential solutions offered by 
Canadian citizens included legal checks and balances on information sharing or a complete ban on 
information sharing with foreign states entirely.  
 Freedom of mobility seemed also to be a concern frequently mentioned regarding the Action Plan. 
This included directly advocating for complete freedom of movement in terms of Canadians crossing the 
border. For example, citizen 0036 wrote, “Other than screening for criminals and dangerous cargo, the state 
has no business interfering in the free movement of people and goods.” Again there is a law-abiding citizen 
appeal presenting itself in which the citizen only advocates that the criminal other and dangerous or risky 
cargo get screened at the border, and everyone else have complete freedom of mobility across the border. 
Citizen 0066 similarly stated, “The visa is always a burden and key issue for staying and working. I hope 
that both governments can do something to encourage the free movement of people.” The request for 
freedom of mobility also occasionally echoed concerns of business interest groups that business travel 
across North American borders is often burdensome and unnecessarily complicated. For example, citizen 
0009 submitted,  
Most of my work is scheduled in Canada. Occasionally I get urgent last minute requests to teach 
[portion blacked out under s. 19(1) of the Access to Information Act] courses outside Canada. If I 
am available, I will accept these international assignments with the sole exception of the United 
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States because of my experiences with US Homeland Security and the TN Visa process which is 
needlessly bureaucratic and unpredictable. 
 
Freedom of mobility submissions also included suggestions that the Canada-U.S. border should be arranged 
in a way much the same as the Schengen Zone in the European Union in which security and immigration 
concerns are administered at the perimeter and then people have unrestricted movement between member 
nations inside the zone afterwards. 10 Citizen 0157 also stated,  
I would recommend that the three NAFTA members follow the model of the European Union… 
institutions and programs could draw their inspiration from agencies like Frontex… Europol… and 
programs like the Schengen Information System… The goal of these… organizations would be the 
creation of a secure travel and customs area with strong external border controls (i.e. passport and 
customs controls for people and goods arriving from outside our three countries) and the eventual 
removal of internal border controls for travel between Canada, the United States, and Mexico. 
 
Much like the suggestion that immigrants and refugees require strong policing while entering the continent 
(which will be discussed further below), this quote highlights how there is a perceived need for tight 
requirements only for those traveling from outside North America – not Canadians and Americans within 
the perimeter. In the above quotations, while Canadian citizens do not always problematize security as 
antithetical to freedom of mobility, they do nonetheless advocate for freedom of mobility provisions and 
practices within North America as part of the Action Plan. As such, Canadians often focused their 
construction of security to include mobility provisions consistent with freedoms and human rights 
provisions found elsewhere.   
 There was also the suggestion made by many citizens that the consultation process initiated by the 
Government of Canada was either non-transparent or otherwise fraudulent, and that democratic processes 
were suffering as a result. For example, citizen 0209 wrote, “So I would not be surprised if our concerns are 
not noted, because the concerns of corporate business and so called ‘security’ will be the only points of 
view taken.” In this quote, the citizen feels that the views of citizens will be deferred in order to instead take 
the views of corporate businesses and the security concerns of the state within the Action Plan itself. Citizen 
0294 maintained that the consultation process is nothing but a smokescreen designed to accomplish state 
goals,  
The really sad part about all this is that the comments that ordinary citizens include here will have 
zero effect on the larger target goals. This forum is nothing more than a part of the smoke screen to 
ease the population into accepting gradual erosion of their freedoms and rights. 
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In the aforementioned quotations, and in similar submissions by individual Canadian citizens, security is 
problematized as a state creation serving exclusively the needs of the state itself as well as private industry 
while not including any of the concerns of individual citizens. In this sense, many individual Canadian 
citizens felt that the aforementioned rights-based discourse would be completely overlooked in favour of a 
pre-set construction of security comprised of business and state interests. 
 Overall, many individual Canadian citizen submissions problematized the perceived loss of human 
rights, privacy, freedom of mobility, and democracy as a result of the border security provisions of the state. 
Security is portrayed as antithetical to human rights in a discourse very similar to the “security as 
illiberalism” discourse offered by Roach (2003), Amoore (2006), Welch (2007), Hudson (2009) and 
O’Malley (2010). Individual Canadian citizens often advocated for legal checks and balances regarding 
human rights, privacy, freedom of mobility, and democracy as potential solutions. 
4. Combating Illegal Immigration and Fraudulent Refugees 
 Among individual citizen submissions, there was also the pervasive notion that states are not doing 
enough to combat illegal immigration, or that states need to do more to combat the threat of “outsiders” 
generally. This frequently invoked the notion that there are currently holes in the Canadian immigration 
system or that Canadian standards are overly lax. For instance, citizen 0147 wrote,  
Immigration however, is a whole different story in my opinion. The laws are way too lax, and there 
are people getting into this country way too easily. The crime I see rise on account of new 
immigrants in my community is alarming and concerning to me and my fellow neighbours [sic]. 
This has to stop. 
 
This quote firmly places immigrants in the category of the “criminal other” in opposition to the perceived 
law-abiding citizen born and raised in Canada. Citizen 0234 likewise stated, 
Canada needs to align its immigration/border security controls to be the same as the USA. Using 
ESTA [and] Biometric [sic] immigration entry (US-VISIT). USA also needs to implement US-
VISIT for EXITING humans. Canada needs to do this also. Canada is way too lax. 
 
Here again, Canada is portrayed to be lax on immigration, and it is suggested that Canada should follow a 
supposedly less-lax United States model in order to align continental security and immigration controls. 
 As noted in one quotation above, citizens also frequently noted the existence of what they referred 
to as criminal or terrorist immigrants when immigration issues were discussed in submissions to the 
BBWG. Citizen 0227 submitted,  
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I would suggest that Canada tighten up its ridiculously open and lenient immigration and refugee 
system. Remove illegals quickly and change legislation to stop affording them all of the delays our 
legal system provides. Work with the US to stop boatloads of illegals from coming to our shores. 
Undocumented refugees and ‘immigrants’ arriving by plane should be sent back on the next flight.  
 
In this sense, citizen 0227 firmly places migrants in the category of criminal immigrants and fraudulent 
refugees who come to North America illegally and are therefore undeserving of living in Canada. Citizen 
0264 likewise stated,  
Canada needs to stop being a doormat for illegal immigrants, mask-wearing illegals, and anyone 
who tries to jump the legitimate queue. Send them home on the first airplane, or refuse permission 
for their boats to come ashore. Only then, can Canada hope to work on an equal basis with the U.S. 
 
In the above quotation again it seems that Canada is viewed as an “open door” of sorts for illegal 
immigration, and that there is a need for greater enforcement in this area to align Canadian policies with the 
United States. Citizen 0250 echoed this concern while also suggesting that Canada panders to the criminal 
and terrorist immigrant:  
How about ACTUALLY deporting criminals instead of giving them years and sometimes decades 
of appeals…. Reduce immigration numbers… stop being so kindly [sic] to terrorists and maybe the 
US will take OUR national security seriously… Maybe keep illegal flesh peddlers and smugglers 
out of Canada. If a criminal is ordered deported… THEN DEPORT THEM… How about showing 
the WORLD that our justice system actually penalizes terrorists instead of coddling them and 
treating our own citizens like criminals.  
 
Here, immigrants are paired with criminals and terrorists in direct contrast to law-abiding Canadian citizens. 
In essence, the citizen argues that the criminal immigrant should be treated as a criminal and not afforded 
rights and protections under the law whereas Canada should afford more rights and greater treatment to its 
own citizens (the law-abiding citizens).  
 Other immigration-related submissions focused on perimeter or other controls on immigration 
without specifically invoking the criminal immigrant discourse. Citizen 0098 for instance stated,  
We should have a common security zone… anyone trying to come in from outside Canada/US 
would require the current strong requirements for entry. Anyone within the Canadian/US zone 
would be free to travel as with domestic travel between provinces/states.  
 
Again is the notion that migrants from outside of North America should require strict security requirements 
while those living inside North America should not be problematized or securitized. Citizen 0235 similarly 
wrote,  
With that said anything that needs to be done to protect our Country [sic] and its citizens should be 
done and the old addict [sic] an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure applies in this 
instance. Find it, Address it, Stop it [sic] before it reaches our shores. 
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Again there is the suggestion that migration from outside North America represents some sort of threat that 
needs to be pre-emptively stopped to protect those living in North America. Through all of the above 
quotations, it is apparent that many individual Canadian citizens problematize immigration and migrants 
generally, and also lax immigration laws more specifically. Citizens seem to offer greater immigration 
enforcement as a potential solution, along with lessening enforcement of North Americans inside the 
proposed perimeter in order to focus on those coming from outside the perimeter.  
Other Interest Group Security Discourses 
Introduction to Other Interest Group Submissions 
 Approximately nineteen “other interest groups” provided submissions to the BBWG. The criteria 
used in identifying these other interest groups included: 1) that they are not businesses, business interest 
groups, or entire economic regions, and 2) that they did not advocate directly on behalf of the Government 
of Canada or specific government agencies. Of the nineteen identified other interest groups, submissions 
were acquired from eleven organizations. This included six “think tank” submissions, three human rights-
based offices or organizations, one public service union, and one labour union. Perhaps most dismaying is 
the fact that submissions were not made available from the four First Nations organizations identified as 
consultation groups by the Government of Canada. Submissions were also not made available by two of the 
eight think tanks and one special interest advocacy group consulted by the BBWG. The Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada was included in this section of analysis given that the Privacy Commissioner 
represents Canadian citizen interests directly and is only responsible for reporting to Parliament and not 
necessarily supporting government initiatives. The specific discourses outlined by other interest groups are 
discussed below. 
1. Human Rights Discourse 
 Other interest group submissions first and foremost included the discourse that provisions about 
human rights, freedoms, privacy, and democracy must be made within the Action Plan itself as a check on 
state security-related activities. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) focused most of its 
comments on human rights, freedoms, and privacy issues. For example, the CCLA in its submission stated,  
The CCLA recommends that the Action Plan must include safeguards consistent with the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms… Such safeguards must include methods of 
accountability with respect to the necessity, proportionality and reasonableness of any collection, 
	   47 
dissemination, storage and use of personal information, including biometric information, of 
individuals (p. 2-3).  
 
In this submission, the CCLA advocates for checks on government action in terms of border security 
techniques relying on sharing and using personal information. The CCLA was also concerned about 
information sharing abuses, calling for further restraints:  
As demonstrated by the case of Maher Arar, inappropriate interjurisdictional information sharing 
can have grave consequences for the rights and lives of Canadians. The CCLA believes that clear 
procedures must be established regarding how information encountered during the course of a 
cross-border law enforcement action may be shared and used by U.S. officials. This would include 
a general prohibition against further using or communicating private and confidential information 
to other U.S. agencies or foreign governments (p. 7). 11 
 
Individual Canadian citizen responses also occasionally invoked the Maher Arar case in their responses as 
evidence that information sharing with foreign states requires checks and balances that ensure the rights and 
freedoms of Canadians are not disregarded or otherwise abused. The CCLA also called for greater checks 
on electronic security,  
In particular, the CCLA would call for assurances that Canadian Criminal Code and Charter 
protections apply to any electronic surveillance, wiretaps, and disclosure of information by and 
among law enforcement agencies. Further, any disclosure of information from the private sector to 
government must comply with Canadian legal safeguards including those contained in the PIPEDA 
or equivalent provincial privacy legislation, and in the Canadian Charter (p. 9). 12 
 
Again, the CCLA advocates that Charter rights and other protections be applied not only to physical 
security techniques, but also electronic security and surveillance techniques. While most of the previous 
submissions focused on border security techniques as well as information sharing, the CCLA also includes 
electronic security and surveillance techniques as other security techniques occurring away from the 
traditional physical border while still contributing to the state need for security. This is an important 
discourse given that it reflects the recent trend of technology allowing borders to expand inward and 
outward from the traditional physical border and to encompass more and more aspects of life such that the 
border is theoretically everywhere (see Amoore 2006 and Broeders 2007 for instance). The majority of the 
CCLA’s submission advocated for checks, balances, and legal procedures placed on states regarding border 
security and other surveillance techniques consistent with pre-existing legislation. In this way, the CCLA 
problematized unrestricted security practices of the state and offered legal protections as a potential solution 
in order to ensure human rights, freedoms, and privacy are protected. The concerns of the Council of 
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Canadians were very similar to the human rights, freedoms, privacy, and other concerns outlined by the 
CCLA. 
 The C.D. Howe Institute released a paper by Daniel Schwanen, Associate Vice President, Trade 
and International Policy in which he stated the concern that “…the Action Plan could be derailed if it does 
not pay attention to overarching considerations such as protecting individual rights and guarding against the 
misuse of confidential information” (Schwanen 2011: 1). The full report goes on to say  
…the public should trust that restrictions applied for security reasons do not trump individual 
rights, or rights to privacy or confidentiality, without due process, at least in non-emergency 
circumstances. Canada needs to be transparent about the type of information it intends to share, 
why it is relevant to addressing security concerns, and what assurances there are that the 
information shared will not exceed what is necessary or be misused (Schwanen 2011: 3).  
 
The C.D. Howe Institute called for a mechanism in which the state informs Canadians that their personal 
information is to be shared with the United States and that there is redress if information is improperly 
shared. In this sense, the C.D. Howe Institute problematizes unrestricted information sharing and proposes 
legal checks and balances as well as redress mechanisms as potential solutions.  
 The Privacy Commissioner of Canada also commented in this regard. The Privacy 
Commissioner’s submission to the BBWG echoed what several individual Canadian citizens had also 
mentioned about U.S. Customs and Border Protection – namely that many citizens of Canada since 2005 
began to report to her office about difficulties in crossing the border for the purposes of business, shopping, 
or to visit friends and family. In essence, while there is again the application of the law-abiding citizen 
appeal in the presumed innocence of these actions, the Privacy Commissioner goes on to explain that many 
of these difficulties occurred as a result of increased information sharing with the United States. She stated,  
In Canada, many side-effects of mass collection, analysis and sharing of personal information with 
US security agencies and border authorities have clearly been unanticipated. These cases have 
ranged from the inconvenience of being stopped crossing the border on the basis of a suicide 
attempt five years in the past to the tragic rendition of a Canadian citizen to torture in Syria (OPC 
2011: 2).  
 
In this sense, the Privacy Commissioner appeals that law-abiding citizens should not be subject to the 
“inconvenience” of being stopped at the border based on perceived less-serious and less-risky activities 
such as past suicide attempts or – in the case of Maher Arar alluded to above – based on faulty shared 
intelligence. Regarding information sharing, the Privacy Commissioner stressed,  
The major observation to emerge from those reviewed cases was the sensitivity investigators need 
to exercise before they label citizens with the word ‘terrorist’ or ‘extremist’ because of the 
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longstanding consequences arising from these individual profiles. Maher Arar, despite having been 
cleared of any wrongdoing in Canada, remains on the U.S. no fly list to this day (OPC 2011: 4).  
 
Here, the Privacy Commissioner states that there are often no redress mechanisms for landing on a U.S. “no 
fly” or other security list. Furthermore, the Privacy Commissioner puts forth a notion very similar to 
labeling theory in criminology that once one is labeled as a “terrorist” or as an “extremist”, there are severe 
lasting consequences regarding mobility and treatment at the border in the future. Again, the Privacy 
Commissioner invokes the Maher Arar case as an example of why investigators should not be so quick to 
apply such labels to individual Canadian citizens or others. In this respect, the Privacy Commissioner 
recommended that the Government of Canada focus instead on the screening of cargo, goods, and facilities 
in order to minimize the collection of personal information.  
 The Privacy Commissioner also challenged the existence of biometrics, and noted how the 
Government of Canada has yet to legislate standards regarding minimum protections for biometric data. 
The Privacy Commissioner also questioned the sharing of biometric information with the United States, 
advocating instead for local storage of data in order to prevent the risks of covert collection, undisclosed 
usage for secondary purposes, cross-linking across applications or programs, function creep, and 
institutional data breaches (OPC 2011: 7). Regarding the sharing of medical records in the event of a public 
health crisis, the Privacy Commissioner warned,  
The risk of function creep is amplified when the data in question pertains to medical records. 
Disclosure of medical records from hospitals to law enforcement has been viewed, both legally and 
civilly, to be a massive violation of individual privacy. Disclosure of these records to a foreign 
entity is questionable because control of data flows cannot be regulated (OPC 2011: 14).  
 
The Privacy Commissioner concerned herself with function creep in regard to the sharing of information 
(particularly medical information) internationally. Again, there is the prevailing sense that once information 
is shared, Canada will inevitably lose control of just how such information is used unless certain legal 
safeguards are put in place. In general, the Privacy Commissioner stressed that cross-border law 
enforcement activities must be confined by proper legislation and also stressed the importance of deferral to 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Privacy Act, and the Personal Information Protection 
and Electronic Documents Act (OPC 2011: 16). In this sense, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 
problematizes any unrestricted state security technique – physical or otherwise – and proposes legal checks 
and balances as potential solutions. 
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 Other organizations like the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA) likewise were 
concerned about rights, stating,  
The latest of these attempts, the so-called North American Security Perimeter, currently under 
negotiation, is likely to meet the same fate as earlier efforts, short of a major surrender of Canadian 
control over, for example, immigration, refugee and information privacy policies (p. 1).  
 
Here again there is the concern that the Action Plan would mean a loss of Canadian sovereignty as well as 
associated control over human rights, privacy, immigration, refugee, and other policies. The Council of 
Canadians echoed the concerns of the Privacy Commissioner and the CCPA in stating,  
The Commission asked that checks and balances be put in place. They weren’t. Yet the Harper 
government may be about to drastically increase the types and amount of information that is sent 
across the border, as if it were any other commodity. In other words Harper wants to unilaterally 
move us further down the path of integration without making existing security practices truly 
accountable (Barlow and Trew 2011). 
 
A few other interest groups also commented that the perceived lack of democratic processes in relation to 
the Action Plan indicates that the construction of security will inherently be the construction of the state 
itself. The Council of Canadians presented in their submission to the BBWG the dual notion that Canada is 
selling out sovereignty to the United States and that the public consultation process is actually a fraud just 
so Canada and the United States can negotiate in secret. The Council of Canadians released an action alert 
on its website stating,  
Prime Minister Harper… will sign the deal alone, without permission from the Canadian public, 
without approval from Parliament. It’s typical of his government’s anti-democratic record and we 
shouldn’t put up with it. From media reports about the deal, there is no compromise. It could mean 
the wholesale adoption of U.S. security, surveillance, immigration, and military practices in return 
for a hollow promise of a ‘thinner’ border for trade (Council of Canadians 2011).  
 
The Council of Canadians in the above quotation problematizes the notion that the construction of security 
in the Action Plan is essentially a U.S. creation without any Canadian concerns addressed. Secondly, the 
Council of Canadians also draws an apparent distinction between security practices and surveillance, 
immigration, as well as military practices. The Council of Canadians appears to construct security as 
basically border security practices with surveillance, immigration, and military practices constituted as 
something else not involving security.  
 Overall, other interest groups advocated for the development and implementation of legal checks 
and balances against the border security and other security-related practices of the state, particularly when it 
comes to the area of information sharing with the United States. In this sense, the lack of policies and 
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procedures entrenching the protection of rights, privacy, freedoms, and democracy within the Action Plan is 
problematized by other interest groups. 
2. A Dualistic Immigration Perspective 
 Immigration was also a concern of these other interest groups. As stated in the quotation above, the 
CCPA for instance was concerned that Canada would be losing sovereign control over immigration and 
refugee policies should it enter upon this Action Plan with the United States. The CCLA also commented 
on immigration matters:  
Security Perimeter screening methods cannot be used to deny asylum-seekers the ability to reach 
Canadian borders to make a refugee claim. Similarly, individuals within Canada whose refugee 
claim is being processed, or who have received refugee status, must not be rendered vulnerable to 
new harms caused by conflicting US views regarding the status or claims of such individuals. The 
CCLA strongly recommends that the BBWG ensure that Canada maintain its legal commitments to 
refugees and asylum seekers, including upholding the prohibition against non-refoulement to any 
risk of torture. In particular, any rendition, deportation, removal or extradition of individuals from 
Canada to third countries, without full due process protections, is illegal (p. 4-5). 
 
In this sense, rights based and other interest groups moved beyond individual Canadian citizen requests for 
greater security of the immigration and refugee process in Canada and instead concerned themselves with 
immigration and refugee rights and protections. This marks a clear shift from the individual Canadian 
citizen rhetoric of greater enforcement of the immigrant and refugee “other”. In this sense, some other 
interest groups problematize security practices that are perceived to target migrants. Rights and due process 
protections are offered as potential solutions. The Customs and Immigration Union (CIU) conversely 
focused some of its comments on greater immigration enforcement more along the lines of individual 
citizen comments. They suggested that Canada  
[a]mend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) Regulations for persons departing 
Canada to permit the matching of information to defined databases including information which 
would allow the matching of travelers with outstanding domestic criminal and/or deportation 
warrants… [and also] amend [IRPA] Regulations to permit the matching of information with US 
officials for matching to inadmissibility and lookout databases as jointly determined by Canada 
and the US (p. 2). 
 
In this sense, the CIU appeals to the existence of the criminal immigrant frequently cited in individual 
Canadian citizen comments while also calling for greater enforcement capacity via greater information 
sharing mechanisms between Canada and the United States. Immigration enforcement measures are again 
problematized as inadequate and as not achieving intended purposes.  
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3. Risk-Based Pre-Emptive Techniques and Technologies  
 Several of the other interest group submissions also advocated for greater use of risk-based and 
pre-emptive techniques. The C.D. Howe Institute suggested,  
First, it is necessary to move security-related verification mechanisms and personnel away from 
the actual border (an essential feature of the ‘perimeter’ concept), while simultaneously improving 
the two countries’ abilities to distinguish between secure and less secure shipments and individuals 
potentially headed for the border. Second, inspection at the border needs to focus more on 
potentially high-risk movement and less on secure shipments and individuals (Schwanen 2011: 2).  
 
Here there is the notion that border officers and agencies need to more effectively use the risk-based 
techniques and pre-emptive measures at their disposal to separate the law-abiding citizen from those 
deserving of border security practices. Again, there is a distinction between those who are more secure or 
law-abiding, and those who are less secure or law breaking. As such, dividing practices are advocated for as 
a potential solution to the problematized behaviour of applying border security practices to law-abiding 
citizens needlessly. The Customs and Immigration Union (CIU) suggested similarly regarding cargo, 
“Develop common Canada-US cargo screening at Points-of-Entry so that suitably screened and secured 
cargo containers can be expedited for clearance at the Canada-US border” (p. 3). CIU also advocated for 
risk profiling in order to identify those who are low-risk (including commercial carriers) and separate them 
from higher risk individuals necessitating security measures. While there is not the notion present that there 
are “law-abiding citizens” in the CIU submission, there is still the notion that there are those who carry an 
acceptable level of risk, and that the state should 
Implement pre-border clearance at selected locations [and] expand on mutually acceptable low-risk 
but well-monitored identification programs including modification of facilities to expedite the 
clearance of pre-approved travelers and commercial carriers (p. 3). 
 
The Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP) published a paper that also advocated for the greater use 
of risk assessments to allow for differential levels of security. The paper stated:  
We must engage in an open and honest discussion about the role that risk assessment plays in our 
approach to processing transborder passengers. Not all passengers, not all flights and not all 
destinations are equal from a security and interdiction perspective. For example, a weekly flight 
from Lahore or Lagos surely poses a different potential security interest than the thrice-daily flight 
from Allentown to Toronto. Similarly, the Bank of Montreal employee who travels four times a 
month from Toronto to Milwaukee to work on the Harris Bank merger presents an entirely 
different threat profile than a previously unregistered traveller on a route from a known global hot 
spot (McCoomb 2011: 48). 
 
In the above quotation, the IRPP essentially problematizes blanketed border security techniques that do not 
differentiate based on levels of risk. As a solution, the IRPP constructs security as a notion that is not 
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uniform in nature, but rather which may be separated into different levels of intensity in order to 
accommodate different levels of risk. In essence, security is constructed as a technique that can be applied 
differently to different people depending whether and to what extent they are perceived to pose a threat. 
Again there is also the suggestion that differential levels of risk exist between the law-abiding business 
worker traveling in North America and unknown outsiders entering the continent from outside the security 
perimeter.  
 Other interest groups also highlighted how technology is perceived to be a highly effective way to 
complete the tasks associated with border security while also not inconveniencing law-abiding citizens. The 
Customs and Immigration Union advocated that the Government of Canada  
Expand the RCMP tested (already deployed in some areas) automated analytical marine and low-
flying aircraft radar system on an integrated basis with US authorities to further support cross-
border interdiction activities (p. 2).  
 
Here, technology is presented as an infallible way to provide security to implicit holes in continental 
security, namely against marine-based and low-flying aircraft penetration of the perimeter. In this CIU 
submission, technology is equated to security with technology constructed as essentially providing security 
itself. Regarding the identified problematized behaviour then, technology is presented as the solution in and 
of itself. The CIU also wrote,  
CIU has advocated the creation and deployment of an Enhanced Lookout System using face 
recognition biometric technology in multiple submissions to Government and Parliament as well as 
through officer safety complaints pursuant to the Canada Labour Code (p. 2). 
 
In this sense, here and in the rest of its submission to the BBWG, biometric technology is portrayed as an 
infallible way to detect those perceived to be risky and those willing to do harm to Canada as well as a way 
to keep officers safe in enhancing the ability to detect dangerous individuals before harm occurs. The IRPP 
stated that there is a need to shift focus on how to best use technology to make the border more 
sophisticated and risk-based: 
Regrettably, too often in Canada we speak of customs and immigration from the perspective of 
whether the individual agent is polite or greets the passenger appropriately. It goes beyond that. 
We need to focus higher and in a more sophisticated manner… We must make better use of 
technology, such as the established trusted-traveller program Nexus and emerging programs such 
as Automated Border Clearance (ABC), which, as the name suggests, uses automation through 
kiosk technology to process lower-risk passengers (Lennox 2011: 70). 
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While the IRPP quotation does not go as far as the CIU submission to construct security as technology, the 
quotation does still suggest that technology may be better used to assist in border security techniques. In 
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6. ANALYSIS 
Which Discourses Were Reflected in the Action Plan? 
 The Action Plan of course serves as the main document for indicating how (and if) the 
Government of Canada used the consultation process in its construction of security. According to all 
accounts in the Action Plan itself and in other publications, the Government of Canadian initiated the public 
consultation process prior to the formation of the Action Plan in order to gauge public opinion and 
ultimately construct the plan in accordance with the needs of business interest groups, individual Canadian 
citizens, and other interest groups. While several security discourses as well as problematized activities 
were identified in the business interest group, individual Canadian citizen, and other interest group 
submissions in the sections above, the Action Plan must be analyzed to determine how (and if) these 
identified constructions and problematized activities contribute to how security is constructed within the 
Action Plan itself. In other words, the Action Plan document must be examined to determine if all 
discourses from all interested groups are universally adopted in the Action Plan, if the Action Plan 
selectively incorporates certain discourses while ignoring others, or if the Action Plan ignores all identified 
discourses with other constructions of security presented instead. 
 It should be noted firstly that several discourses found within the Action Plan were generally 
agreed upon by the identified parties in the consultation process – Canadian citizens, business interest 
groups, and other interest groups – notably, greater protections against terrorism generally, the increased 
use of risk-based techniques in order to profile more effectively at the border, increasing the flow of 
travelers across the border, protecting critical infrastructure, increasing cyber security, and so forth. The 
analysis that follows will instead focus on those key discourses identified in the sections above that were 
either unique to or shared by individual Canadian citizens, business interest groups, and other interest 
groups. In this way it should become clear which individual security discourses and problematizations from 
the consultation process are ultimately incorporated within the Action Plan. 
Business Interest Group Discourses 
 Prolific throughout the Action Plan are commitments to several of the suggestions made by 
business interest groups in submissions to the BBWG. In fact, business interest groups seem to have the 
majority influence (other than government) on how security is constructed within the Action Plan itself with 
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most business interest group concerns addressed and plans made to correct associated problematized 
behaviour. First, business interest groups of course primarily focused most of their submissions on 
compelling the government to work toward a more predictable border in order to facilitate supply chain 
management. This included requests to harmonize policies that are perceived to negatively impact supply 
chain management, remove redundant searches, establish more uniform immigration and security 
techniques, formalize officer discretion, eliminate random border exams, and move inspections away from 
the border. Underlying all the aforementioned discourses was an overarching assumption amongst business 
interest groups that while security is important to ensuring business prosperity, security should not trump 
trade and the economy. In this respect, business interest groups often advocated for a “lesser of two evils” 
approach to security in order to promote trade and profit rather than stymie it. Security itself is therefore 
mostly portrayed as a need of the state that often conflicts with the needs of individual businesses to 
increase profit. The Action Plan itself seems to adopt this construction of security, acknowledging that the 
state need for security should not trump the needs of businesses while also instituting the “lesser of two 
evils” approach to security. In the introduction to the section, “Part II: Trade Facilitation, Economic Growth 
and Jobs” the Action Plan explicitly states:  
The free flow of goods and services between Canada and the United States creates immense 
economic benefits for both countries. As our two countries work to strengthen the security of our 
shared perimeter, we will take steps simultaneously to create more openness at the land border for 
legitimate travel and trade (GOC 2011a: 13).  
 
The Action Plan therefore constructs security as a need of the two states involved in the Action Plan itself 
and also presents security in direct opposition to the flow of legitimate travel and trade.  
 Many of the solutions presented in the Action Plan to achieve these perceived opposing needs of 
security as well as trade and travel facilitation reflect many solutions to problematized behaviours identified 
by business interest groups. For example, business interest group requests to harmonize previous policies 
that are perceived to negatively impact supply chain management were met in the Action Plan. For instance, 
the Action Plan states that governments will “Align Canada’s Customs Self Assessment and the United 
States’ Importer Self-Assessment programs to the greatest extent possible…” (GOC 2011a: 14). The Action 
Plan also states that Canada and the United States will  
Develop a harmonized approach to screening inbound cargo arriving from offshore that will result 
in increased security and the expedited movement of secure cargo across the Canada-United States 
border, under the principle of ‘cleared once, accepted twice’ (GOC 2011a: 6).   
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The “cleared once, accepted twice” discourse was consistently advocated for by business interest groups. 
 Also included in this regard were requests to remove redundancy. Again, these requests were met 
throughout the Action Plan. For instance, the Action Plan states,  
We will develop an integrated, multi-modal customs and transportation security regime, which will 
reduce duplication and move activities away from the Canada-United States border (GOC 2011a: 
6).  
 
Here we see that two of the business interest group suggested solutions to problematized behaviours are 
incorporated – essentially that predictability of border security should be increased by removing duplicitous 
search activities as well as moving search activities away from the border itself. Similarly, the “cleared 
once, accepted twice” discourse is again repeated regarding removing redundancy, “Mutual Recognition of 
Air Cargo: We expect to reduce the number of air cargo loads rescreened to zero beginning in March 2012” 
(GOC 2011a: 7).  
 Regarding business interest group requests for more uniform immigration and security techniques 
as well as more formalized use of officer discretion, the following section of the Action Plan directly 
addresses many specific concerns: 
By June 20, 2012, the [CBSA] and U.S. [CBP] will provide enhanced administrative guidance and 
training to their officers and enhanced operational manuals to achieve optimal operational 
consistency at all ports of entry on business traveller issues… We will review current 
administrative processes under which all categories of business travellers may request adjudication 
of employment and related petitions by the destination country’s immigration authorities to 
identify and resolve potential issues prior to the actual date of travel… By June 30, 2012, we will 
review the effectiveness of existing redress and recourse mechanisms for business travellers whose 
applications are denied… (GOC 2011a: 18).  
 
This quotation incorporates many of the solutions to problematized behaviours championed by business 
interest groups. Business interest groups advocated for more formalized officer discretionary decisions to 
make the border more predictable, and at least one business interest group requested specifically that its 
employees be granted business immigration clearance before reaching the border to enhance predictability 
regarding the flow of employees across the border. Both of these measures were included in the Action 
Plan. Also notable in the above quotation is the fact that officers will receive training in order to make 
business traveller crossings more “consistent”. The inclusion of redress and recourse mechanisms for 
business travellers whose applications are denied by the state is interesting since it appears to be a measure 
not advocated for specifically in any of the obtained business interest group submissions, but is nonetheless 
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incorporated by the Canadian state as a measure to increase predictability and uniform decisions at the 
border.  
 Business interest groups also raised the collection of inspection fees as an unpredictable feature of 
border security regimes. In this respect, the Action Plan promises to reduce costs to businesses crossing the 
border and promote trade competitiveness by 
Develop[ing] for each country an inventory of fees and charges at the border which sets out their 
purpose and legal basis, how they are collected, how much is collected, their intended use and the 
rationale for collecting them at the border; and commission[ing] a third party to conduct an 
economic impact assessment of such fees… on the competitive position of three economic sectors 
in Canada and the United States for which cross-border activity is important (GOC 2011a: 19).  
 
The control of border security fees as well as the establishment of a commission designed to conduct 
economic impact assessments was again a potential solution championed directly by business interest 
groups.  
 Secondly, performance metrics and measures recommended by business interest groups were 
frequently mentioned throughout the document regarding measuring progress of the various new initiatives 
contained in the Action Plan itself. In this sense, the Action Plan adopts the business discourse that 
constructed security as measurable and subject to economic efficiency metrics. For example on the first full 
page of the document it is stated that “The framework will leverage existing forums, emphasize the need to 
economize resources and establish performance metrics” (GOC 2011a: 4). In commenting on establishing 
common approaches to screening travellers, the Action Plan states:  
Canada will join the United States in tracking performance indicators, such as the number of 
inadmissible persons denied permission to travel, the number of high-risk targets identified and the 
number of subsequent enforcement actions taken that were facilitated by targeting (GOC 2011a: 
10).  
 
In this respect, it is apparent that much as was the case for business interest groups, the Canadian state 
agrees that border security techniques can be subject to performance indicators to measure success and 
increase efficiency. Regarding trusted trader programs, the Action Plan proposes that Canada and the 
United States 
…will identify and assess options to collect data in advance through streamlined and more efficient 
means that are more responsive to shippers’ business processes… The Canada Border Services 
Agency and the U.S. Department of Homeland security will measure the increased membership in 
trusted trader programs, the associated increased volume of trade covered by the programs, and 
lower examination rates and processing times for members. We will assess the success of the pilots 
discussed above and whether they have expedited trade (GOC 2011a: 15).  
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In this respect, even trusted trader programs designed to increase information available to the state to aid in 
security and the flow of goods across the border is reducible in the context of the Action Plan to simple 
performance measurements. Even environmental improvements are offered as a benchmark or performance 
indicator for border security in the Action Plan: “Reductions in the environmental impact due to reduced 
border wait times will be measured in decreases and percentage decreases in tons of greenhouse gas 
emissions” (GOC 2011a: 20). In discussing alleviating border wait times in order to help the economy, the 
Action Plan states:  
The Canada Border Services Agency and U.S. Customs and Border Protection will develop a plan 
to identify reasonable and achievable border wait-time service levels at major crossings… This 
may lead to increased efficiency and reduced delays at the border (GOC 2011a: 21). 
 
Again, border security practices are portrayed frequently within the Action Plan as needing to be subject to 
performance indicators, efficiency metrics and measures, and so forth. This is very much in line with how 
business interest groups constructed security in their BBWG submissions. 
 Business interest groups also called for more direct benefits for those in voluntary trusted trader 
programs in continuing with their overarching discourse that security should not trump trade. The Action 
Plan again reciprocated this discourse. For instance, regarding advance data requirements for shippers, the 
Action Plan promises to,  
Identify and evaluate options, by September 2012, under which trusted traders could use alternate 
processes and approaches to submit advance data elements, including examining whether and how 
existing program flexibilities can be enhanced (GOC 2011a: 6).  
 
In the introduction to “Part II: Trade Facilitation, Economic Growth and Jobs”, the Action Plan states, “The 
Beyond the Border Action Plan enhances the benefits of programs that help trusted businesses and 
travellers more effectively across the border…” (GOC 2011a: 13). The Action Plan goes on to state that this 
will include harmonizing the Partners in Protection program with the Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism program and offering new benefits, including an automated enrolment system and extending 
FAST benefits to the two aforementioned programs starting mid-2012 (GOC 2011a: 14). Business interest 
groups in their submissions to the BBWG made this specific request time and time again, and the Action 
Plan reciprocated. The Action Plan also addresses another business interest group request that FAST cards 
used by truck drivers be extended to also cover other specified security programs such as NEXUS (GOC 
2011a: 15). It also accepts another business interest group suggestion that NEXUS client profiles contain 
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relevant immigration and other documents in order to expedite business traveler clearance across the border 
(GOC 2011a: 18). 
 In addition, risk-management techniques posited by business interest groups as the solution to 
border security and efficiency issues were also adopted in the Action Plan. For instance, “In addition, we 
will explore product-specific pilots aimed at lowering inspection rates for certain industry sectors based on 
regulatory compliance history” (GOC 2011a: 15). This met the business interest group request for lowered 
inspection rates as well as differential risk-based assessments of businesses based on their prior or current 
cooperation with the state. This section will not go into any great detail about risk-management techniques 
since – as mentioned at the outset of this section on the Action Plan – the use of risk by states was a 
discourse generally agreed upon in submissions by the three submission groups involved in the consultation 
process. Suffice it to say though, the Action Plan contains a great deal of risk-based discourse that 
specifically benefits private industry. 
 When it comes to business interest groups, it actually seems the only repeated discourse not 
specifically adopted by the Action Plan was the request that Canada and the United States eliminate random 
examinations because they are perceived to be ineffective and end up costing businesses money needlessly. 
While the Action Plan made no commitment to this effect, as mentioned above, the Action Plan did agree to 
provide an inventory of fees and allow for third-party study of the impact of these fees against economic 
regions (and perhaps ultimately their removal). In a sense then, the state may be taking steps in making 
random examinations less “painful” economically for businesses by removing the random examination 
inspection fees that businesses actively protested in their submissions, though it seems random 
examinations themselves will not specifically be removed anytime in the near future. Overall, the Action 
Plan adopts the overarching discourse amongst business interest groups that while security is important to 
ensuring business prosperity, security should not trump trade and the economy. The Action Plan also 
adopted many of the “lesser of two evils” approaches to security advocated for in business interest group 
submissions as potential solutions to problematized behaviours. In this sense, the Action Plan also therefore 
constructs security as a need of the state that often conflicts with the need of individual businesses to 
increase profits. 
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Individual Canadian Citizen and Other Interest Group Discourses  
 Present in the Action Plan is a notion very similar to the law-abiding citizen appeal identified in 
the individual Canadian Citizen and other interest group submissions. In the Action Plan, the Government 
of Canada assures that in conjunction with the United States, border security techniques and technologies 
can effectively separate the law-abiding citizen from the criminal other (including also the immigrant or 
refugee other) and subject individuals to screening measures accordingly. For instance, in the introduction 
to the section “Addressing Threats Early”, the Action Plan states: 
The Beyond the Border Action Plan will support this goal by developing a common understanding 
of the threat environment; aligning and coordinating our security systems for goods, cargo, and 
baggage; and supporting the effective identification of people who pose a threat, which will 
enhance safety and facilitate the movement of legitimate travellers (GOC 2011a: 3).  
 
This quotation is congruent with the discourse supported by individual Canadian citizens that there are in 
fact law-abiding citizens and law-breaking citizens, and that these two groups need to be separated from 
each other at the border in order to facilitate security and “legitimate travel”. The Action Plan also included 
a new type of threat not identified in individual citizen, business, or other interest group submissions, 
namely homegrown extremism. Again, the homegrown extremist is presented as a criminal other in need of 
greater enforcement:  
We will: Coordinate and share research on how people become radicalized and turn to violence; 
Share best practices and tools for law enforcement and corrections partners to detect, prevent and 
respond to this threat… Emphasize community-based and community-driven efforts. This will 
include collaborating on how to engage with communities and build their resilience against violent 
extremists who seek to target specific communities in our respective countries… (GOC 2011a: 5). 
 
While point one seems to indicate that anyone can potentially become an extremist, points two and three 
seem to limit the class to those dealing with law enforcement and corrections officials (i.e. known criminals 
who have gone or are currently going through the penal system) and those who are “violent” and act in 
opposition to the goals and values of communities (i.e. the criminal outsider or other). In this sense, there is 
a clear distinction between criminal outsiders and law-abiding members of a community. 
 Also present is the “criminal immigrant” and “immigrant outsider” discourse in submissions made 
to the BBWG by individual Canadian citizens and other interest groups (most notably the Customs and 
Immigration Union). Largely absent in the Action Plan is any appeal to immigrant rights or refugee rights 
mentioned in submissions made by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and the Canadian Civil 
Liberties Association, among others. The Action Plan states: 
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Canada and the United States will screen travellers seeking to enter either country in order to: At 
the earliest point possible, identify individuals who seek to enter the perimeter for mala fide 
purposes and prevent them from travelling to Canada and the United States; Prevent individuals 
from assuming different identities between one country and the other; Identify those who have 
committed serious crimes or violated immigration law in the other country and enable informed 
decisions on visas, admissibility or other immigration benefits… (GOC 2011a: 9).  
 
In this sense, migrants from outside of the perimeter are portrayed as criminal immigrants with mala fide 
purposes, deserving of attention and border security measures to keep them out of North America. Unlike 
the law-abiding citizen appeal mentioned above, the Canadian state does not make any mention of 
“legitimate migrants” like they do “legitimate travellers”. Therefore, there is no contrast between the 
criminal migrant and the law-abiding migrant – there is only the presentation of the discourse of the 
criminal migrant. In two more subsections, the Action Plan in talking about screening travellers again 
continues with the discourse of the criminal immigrant. For example,  
We will… provide access to information on those who have been removed, or who have been 
refused admission to, or a visa from, either country, as well as those who have been removed from 
their respective countries for criminal reasons; and implement a systematic and automated 
biographic informing-sharing capability by 2013 and biometric information-sharing capability by 
2014 to reduce identity fraud and enhance screening decisions… We also will explore 
opportunities to broaden asylum cooperation to address irregular migration flows (GOC 2011a: 
10). 
  
Again, there is only the construction of the migrant fraudster and the “irregular migrant” refugee, and no 
mention of any law-abiding deserving migrant or refugee. It appears in this quotation that while the 
Customs and Immigration Union’s request for greater ability to share information regarding immigration 
and refugee violators was met, the views of other interest groups regarding immigrant and refugee rights 
were largely ignored in the Action Plan. 
 What is also notably absent from the Action Plan is the human rights, freedoms, privacy, and 
democracy language that comprised many of the critiques and concerns about the Action Plan asserted by 
individual Canadian citizens and other interest groups. In fact, such language only appears on three pages of 
the 32 page main Action Plan document. Two of the instantiations occupy only one part of one sentence in 
two different places in the document. On page four the first such mention is made: “Promoting increased 
informal sharing of law-enforcement intelligence, information and evidence through police and 
prosecutorial channels consistent with the respective domestic laws of each country” (GOC 2011a: 4). On 
page nine, the second mention is made, “Share relevant, reliable and accurate information within the legal 
and privacy regimes of both countries, such as information contained in biographic and biometric national-
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security watch lists, certain traveller criminal-history records and immigration violations” (GOC 2011a: 9). 
Ironically, the majority of such language can be found on page 32 – the very last page of the Action Plan 
main document. It is as if human rights, freedoms, privacy, and democracy concerns were an afterthought to 
the agreement, presented after the bulk of the border-related recommendations and just before the “Annex” 
section. Interestingly, this section appears on only half of page 32 and only after another section concerned 
with forming a steering committee to ensure the security and economic plans mentioned in the Action Plan 
progresses forward as detailed. The bulk of the discussion of privacy rights states,  
Responsible sharing not only demonstrates respect for the rule of law but also facilitates and 
promotes the flow of accurate, relevant and necessary information to address threats to national 
security and conduct law enforcement while respecting citizens’ civil liberties. It is in this spirit 
that the Beyond the Border Declaration commits our two countries to protecting privacy in all the 
initiatives we are undertaking and to stating the privacy protection principles that will inform and 
guide our work in this regard (GOC 2011a: 32).  
 
While this statement recognizes a “commitment” on the part of government to adhere to privacy law and 
principles, and the paragraph that follows states several ways in which this can be developed, the Action 
Plan contains no specific guidelines, privacy principles, or other provisions legislating or ensuring Canada 
and the United States adhere by their commitment. Furthermore, the Government of Canada states that in 
regard to the drafting of a joint statement of privacy principles, “Public Safety Canada, the Department of 
Justice Canada, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Justice will 
complete the statement by May 30, 2012” (GOC 2011a: 32). Thus, rather than reassuring private citizens as 
recommended by the Privacy Commissioner and other interest groups, the governments of Canada and the 
United States instead did not provide any privacy or rights provisions in the Action Plan itself, deferring it 
instead until May 30, 2012 while also highlighting throughout the entire document several ways both 
governments plan to use perceived intrusive techniques to invade privacy, disregard human rights, and 
sacrifice democracy all without checks or balances in place. While other measures in the Action Plan have 
benchmarks and projected dates of implementation and so forth, privacy rights are afforded only a non-
binding commitment and a “due date” for a non-binding joint statement of privacy principles not actually 
even contained in the Action Plan itself. 
 Also notably absent are any mechanisms addressing the numerous complaints filed to the BBWG 
by individual Canadian citizens and some other interest groups that the consultation process was fraudulent 
or that citizen remarks would be largely ignored in the Action Plan itself. In this sense, the construction of 
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security was problematized in that it presented as a state or corporate construction that ultimately did not 
reflect the views and needs of individual Canadian citizens. As mentioned above, it does seem several of 
the problematized behaviours identified by individual citizens and other interest groups were in fact ignored 
by the Canadian state in drafting the Action Plan. The very absence of any comments about these 
problematized behaviours seems to show the Canadian state’s lack of enthusiasm for listening to, 
addressing, and correcting non-business and non-government concerns brought forth in the BBWG public 
consultation process. Furthermore, throughout the entire Action Plan, regarding implementing the various 
measures outlined in the document, the Action Plan makes mention of consulting only government agencies 
(entire document) and private business stakeholders (pages 14, 18, 22, 28, 29) as the process moves 
forward. There is no mention of any further public or NGO participation on any of the mechanisms 
throughout the entire document. Particularly, there is no mention of further public, NGO, or Privacy 
Commissioner consultation regarding these groups’ main areas of concern, namely human rights, privacy, 
freedom and democracy issues. There is also no mention of further public, NGO, or Privacy Commissioner 
consultation in the anticipated joint statement of privacy principles. Furthermore, several individual 
Canadian citizens and some other interest groups maintained that the construction of security would be 
unilateral or based on a construction designed by the United States with no reference to the consultation 
process. Some other interest groups similarly brought forward the issue that the Government of Canada had 
largely failed to address Parliament about the Action Plan and had thus also failed to allow for any relevant 
democratic debate. 13 Other than mentioning that “appropriations to support implementation will be sought 
through the normal budgetary process of each country” (GOC 2011a: II), there is no mention made 
anywhere in the document of the Government of Canada planning to provide Parliament with any status 
reports, consult Parliament on any of the future issues related to the Action Plan, or involve Parliament in 
any other way in the process whatsoever. A few sections mention filing “public reports”, but it is unclear 
whether or not Parliament will ultimately be consulted on or debate these reports, or if the reports will 
simply be released on government websites. The fact that the Action Plan contains no further public 
consultation or parliamentary oversight mechanisms stands in stark contrast to a statement made in a 
Government of Canada document summarizing the submissions made by interest groups to the BBWG, 
which stated: 
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This report is the beginning of the process, not the end. As the Action Plan is developed and 
implemented, there will be ongoing discussions with Canadians. Some measures may require 
further, detailed consultation, including parliamentary oversight. Overall, the Government of 
Canada believes that the input Canadians have provided will ensure an Action Plan that better 
aligns with the interests of Canadians, and of Canada (GOC 2011b: 5). 
 
While this statement provided a firm commitment toward further consultation of Canadians as well as 
parliamentary oversight, and both Canada and the United States mentioned a firm commitment to human 
rights, privacy, freedoms, and democracy in their Joint Declaration for a Shared Vision for Perimeter 
Security and Economic Competitiveness, the Action Plan itself contains little-to-no mechanisms to address 
or ensure these concerns are met or that the Canadian public was or will be consulted and their concerns 
addressed and met in regard to the Action Plan.  
 Lastly, it also appears that no mechanisms were introduced in the Action Plan to deal with the 
individual Canadian citizen discourse that further integration with the United States could serve to increase 
Canada’s risk of terrorist attacks or other security issues rather than decrease such a risk. There is no 
mention whatsoever of the United States’ foreign policy record and ethics violations that were often raised 
by individual Canadian citizens. In this sense, the Action Plan promises to forge ahead with deeper 
integration while offering no measures to allay existing Canadian fears. In short, it should be evident that 
while a vast majority of business interest group discourses surrounding security were adopted in the Action 
Plan document, individual citizen and other interest group discourses were far more selectively 
incorporated, if at all. From the findings above, a discussion about what governmentality can therefore be 
discerned follows. 
What Governmentality Can Be Discerned? 
Business Interest Group Security Discourses 
 First and foremost, the business fascination with risk, predictability, minimizing risk (especially in 
the supply chain), efficiency models and metrics, and overall profitability reflects the proliferation of neo-
liberalism. This shift in economic policies ultimately has resulted in corporations that are essentially 
obsessed with risk management, single-focused on reducing costs and maximizing profit, and resistant to 
any form of government management or regulation that might act to negatively influence the supply chain 
or profit potential of businesses and business groups (Snider 2000). This neo-liberal discourse was echoed 
time and time again in business interest group submissions to the BBWG. In a sense, the corporate world 
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has used the neo-liberal obsession with risk and precautionary logic characterized in Ericson (2007) to 
effectively problematize government intervention in the economy. According to Ericson (2007), neo-
liberalism is juxtaposed to social liberalism, which is seen to emphasize too much security (Ericson 2007: 
5). Neo-liberalism therefore attempts to transform risk from being a technique of social security (under the 
liberal social imaginary) to a responsibility to be assumed by individuals, corporations, or other self-
governing entities (Ericson 2007: 5). As stated previously then, under a neo-liberal economic model, the 
state should only be serving as a facilitator and enabler of self-governed entrepreneurial risk-taking. Any 
action that acts to curb or otherwise disrupt entrepreneurial risk-taking is – as Snider (2000) points out – 
effectively resisted, repealed, disobeyed or evaded as corporations “educate” citizens and government about 
the virtues of free markets and government non-intervention.  
 As a result of the spread of neo-liberalism as an economic mantra and way of doing business 
generally, there has been a subsequent spread of techniques such as the “just in time” philosophy of 
manufacturing.14 In this respect, “time” has become a key risk factor negatively influencing costs associated 
with supply chain management. In controlling risk factors, Peck (2006) describes the commonly studied 
business practice of “Agile Six Sigma” that was put forward by Christopher and Rutherford (2004).15 Most 
important to this notion is the principle that risk or redundancy (such as time) “should be held in reserve to 
counteract or overcome exceptionally disruptive events” (Peck 2006: 133). Business interest groups 
constantly voiced these kinds of concerns in their submissions to the BBWG – that unpredictable time-
related border security activities should be counteracted or completely overcome in order to ensure that the 
supply chain remains unimpeded by government regulation. This included calls for faster processing times 
and reduced procedures for trusted trader companies, offsite inspections so that goods can move seamlessly 
through the border itself (and not therefore add unpredictable time burdens on supply chain management 
predictions), the end of unpredictable random examinations that delay goods at the border, and so forth. 
 Regarding border security specifically and its associated risks to business, Globerman and Storer 
(2009) highlight how much previous research has indicated that there are direct damaging costs to Canadian 
businesses due to the indirect consequences of longer and less predictable waiting times for shipments to 
cross from Canada into the United States (Globerman and Storer 2009: 172). We see these concerns echoed 
time and time again in the sample submissions to the BBWG. There is the prevailing notion among business 
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interest groups that profitability concerns in terms of supply chain management, reducing time-related 
variables, reducing costs, and maximizing profit are paramount and indeed should not be superseded by 
state border security activities that are perceived to negatively affect the economy. 
 According to Ericson (2007), it is in these very neo-liberal conditions where risk, prediction, and 
uncertainty tend to become more prominent tools of governmentality. We see this in the business interest 
group submissions to the BBWG in which state border security techniques are constructed as a barrier to 
economic security, which in turn increase the level of risk necessary for the private industry to do business, 
stimulate the economy, and create jobs – conditions of the liberal social imaginary. As such, the state is 
ultimately blamed for stagnation of the economy and is tasked with a mandate to remove those 
problematized policies, practices, and risks in order to make border security more predictable, less 
unknowable, and therefore subject to the laissez-faire economic risk calculations and metrics as posited by 
Foucault (2008). Again, these problematizations are not rendered as a result of neutral language and 
interpretation, but rather are focused via political lenses and processes where, in this particular case, 
economic considerations and economic benefit so characteristic of the neo-liberal economic order reign 
supreme and are the considerations whereby all interpretations are made. All things are therefore rendered 
governable by economics. Risk analysis therefore becomes the platform whereon the state places the Action 
Plan on Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness, increasing various measures of data collection 
– including the use of biometrics and voluntary participation in information-based security programs like 
NEXUS, C-TPAT, PIP, FAST, and so forth – in order to accelerate the prevalence of risk calculations, 
focus security practices, and thus allow a theoretically more free flow of people and goods across the border 
in order to achieve the physical security needs of the state while also particularly working to correct those 
problematized security techniques constructed as barriers to the economic goals of businesses. 
Individual Canadian Citizen and Other Interest Group Security Discourses 
 An appreciable number of private citizens supported the risk-based policies and techniques of the 
state in terms of border security, and a few citizens also supported an increased flow of trade across the 
border in order to stimulate the economy and job growth. However, it is also the case that the vast majority 
of citizens as well as other interest groups were concerned in some way about violations of human rights, 
privacy, freedoms, and democracy. Since these concerns were rarely reflected in government publications 
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or in business interest group submissions to the BBWG, but are featured prominently in the submissions 
from private citizens and other interest groups, one must question what present governmentality ultimately 
contributes to such discourses being ignored. 
 While it was mentioned above that individual Canadian citizens and many other interest groups 
had a “security as liberalism” construction of security – namely that the state need for security should not 
trump liberal notions of human rights, privacy, freedom, and democracy – ultimately neo-liberalism instead 
fosters a “security as illiberalism” construction of security. As citizens request greater rights, privacy, and 
freedom of mobility regarding border security practices, risk-based techniques ultimately increase in order 
to meet the private citizen, industry, and other interest group joint demand to separate the law-abiding 
citizen or shipper from the risky individual or group. In this respect, surveillance of the so-called law-
abiding citizen or shipper must also increase in order to make this separation theoretically possible. In this 
respect, the state is compliant in terms of listening to and adopting the neo-liberal citizen demands for 
separation of groups by criminality and thus differential levels of enforcement. From there, a cycle develops 
in which increased surveillance leads to more and more surveillance to continue making this distinction 
possible. Ericson and Haggerty (1997) explain this cycle essentially as a private citizen backlash to neo-
liberal risk-based techniques. They state that  
…privacy is constituted by what escapes institutional risk management surveillance… The quest 
for privacy results in part from structural features of risk society. The more people fear the risks of 
public involvement, the more they withdraw into a privatized lifestyle. The more people are risk-
profiled according to their population identities, the more they feel individualized and separated 
from those not so identified (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 117).  
 
In this sense, privacy is only attainable through trust, which can only be made attainable through 
surveillance (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 117). What this ultimately means is that the more surveillance 
mechanisms are used, the greater the realization becomes that trust is difficult to obtain. Therefore, “The 
greater the presumption of distrust, the greater the space for surveillance, and so on, in an amplifying spiral” 
(Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 117). In essence then, while the neo-liberal subject advocates for risk profiling 
of “criminals” or non-law-abiding citizens, he or she is also inevitably advocating for greater risk profiling 
against the presumed law-abiding citizen in order to theoretically identify him or her as a “law-abiding 
citizen”. Greater and greater techniques of risk must then be used to establish trust and gauge risk. This then 
creates the pushback for rights, privacy, freedoms, and democracy so characteristic of individual Canadian 
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citizen and other interest group submissions to the BBWG and also the demand that “innocent” people be 
treated as law-abiding citizens. This also included individual citizen submissions to the BBWG calling for 
the greater employment of technology to aid in the identification of “risky” people while also 
simultaneously advocating that law-abiding citizens be left alone. This again results in further surveillance 
and risk profiling of every citizen in a cyclical manner. Therefore, while citizen constructions of security 
focus heavily on liberal notions of human rights, privacy, freedom, and democratic protections, it is the case 
that neo-liberal constructions of security dominate the construction of security presented in the Action Plan 
itself in that risk and surveillance beget further risk and surveillance and thus draw away from liberal 
discourses in favour of neo-liberal ones. 
Action Plan Security Discourses 
 Of the submissions received by the Government of Canada from individual Canadian citizens, 
business interest groups, and other interest groups, it is apparent that security is constructed within the 
context of the Action Plan on Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness in an overwhelmingly 
neo-liberal way. Of all the unique discourses identifying problematized behaviours derived from private 
citizen, business, and other interest group submissions to the BBWG, those behaviours that are specifically 
problematized under a neo-liberal focus are almost universally adopted in the Action Plan. The Action Plan 
also subsequently universally ignores those behaviours that are not specifically problematized under a neo-
liberal focus. It can be concluded then that the construction of security presented in the Action Plan 
systematically differed from constructions offered in the consultation process in patterned ways. While the 
consultation process contained a variety of different discourses regarding the construction of security, 
problematized behaviour, and subsequent remedies used, the Action Plan was much more selective and 
discriminate in its selection of discourses. In this sense, the neo-liberal submissions made by business 
interest groups to the BBWG ultimately meshed nicely with the continuing neo-liberal laissez-faire 
relationship between private industry and government that developed through the latter portion of the 20th 
century and into the 21st century, as described, for example, by Harvey (2005).	  In terms of the Action Plan, 
while the governments of Canada and the United States pursue the liberal imaginary of security provision 
for their respective populations, this goal is not balanced against neo-liberalism but rather measured and 
actively controlled by neo-liberal economic concerns. In this respect, security is constructed as neo-liberal 
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in that it may be subjected to performance and efficiency metrics characteristic of the neo-liberal economic 
order itself.  
 In earlier government publications prior to the release of the Action Plan, and in the Action Plan 
itself, it seems that both the governments of Canada and the United States recognize that while security is a 
primary concern for North America, much like it was in the 1970s according to Harvey (2005), economic 
benefits and job growth are also a concern. Since the beginning of the economic downturn in 2008, the 
governments of Canada and especially the United States began scrambling to “jump start” the economy and 
stimulate job growth. While discussion of a perimeter security arrangement existed long before 2008, the 
Action Plan is ultimately predicated on an economic neo-liberal discourse that serves to directly address 
concerns related to increasing business profits with the concomitant promise of also jump starting the 
economy and stimulating job growth. Perhaps this is why eleven pages of the Action Plan are dedicated to 
measures designed to accomplish the goals implicit in the title of the section: “Part II: Trade Facilitation, 
Economic Growth and Jobs,” while human rights and privacy issues are afforded half of a page on the last 
page of the document. These goals coincide nicely with the goals of jump-starting the economy and 
stimulating job growth characteristic of state economic needs found after the economic downturn in 2008. 
Submissions made by business interest groups to the BBWG to this end proposed that essentially the best 
way to achieve the dual goals of security and economic benefit laid out in discussions of such an Action 
Plan is for states to subject security to performance measures and remove or harmonize those policies and 
practices that are particularly inefficient. This was exemplified in business interest group requests for more 
formalized officer discretionary decisions, removal of redundant and random searches, and so forth that 
were all perceived to be state security practices that presented a barrier to international trade and the pursuit 
of profits. By removing these perceived inefficiencies there is also a concomitant promise of increased flow 
of goods and people across the Canada-U.S. border in business interest group submissions. Accordingly, the 
state’s behaviour is problematized and the state is also tasked with implementing solutions to the identified 
problematized behaviour. The state then will focus only on those security practices that are most “effective” 
and thus also simultaneously allow businesses greater control of supply chain management. The perceived 
greater control of the supply chain exists when border barriers are inherently removed, thus decreasing costs 
for industry and implicitly leading to increased job growth and economic production the state so values 
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under the liberal social imaginary. And as can be evidenced by business interest group submissions to the 
BBWG, these neo-liberal means are portrayed as the “only game in town” – the only logical way for 
governments to simultaneously increase both the state need for security and the economic stability and 
profits so valued by businesses. Ultimately, as reflected in the Action Plan, states construct security around 
this very notion. In this sense, security is constructed as a neo-liberal economic notion within the Action 
Plan. 
 In a sense then, there must also be a discussion of what exactly is routinized through the neo-
liberal risk model of security. As mentioned above, it is apparent that neo-liberalism leads to the 
routinization of risk itself through a self-fulfilling tautological relationship. It is quite obvious from the 
Action Plan that neo-liberal economic conceptualizations of security are routinized, but there is also the 
necessity to examine how what is not discussed in the Action Plan is therefore routinized as unimportant to 
the discourse of security.  
 The absence of human rights, privacy, freedom, and democracy language throughout the Action 
Plan implies that such concerns are routinized as not being key features of the discourse of security. In fact, 
in examining House of Commons Hansard Reports from the February 2011 Joint Declaration until 
February 2012 after the Action Plan had been released, the official government (Conservative Party of 
Canada) discourse surrounding border security is to continuously emphasize how the Action Plan will 
ultimately benefit the economy and create jobs. After almost every opposition question regarding human 
rights, privacy, freedom, and democracy the Government of Canada reminded the opposition member and 
Canadians about the economic benefits of the Action Plan while not specifically answering the question 
directly, often even accusing the opposition of fear mongering in turn.16 In this sense, the Government of 
Canada through the Action Plan and through parliamentary debate has portrayed the discourse surrounding 
security as an overwhelmingly economic and neo-liberal form of security, while also routinizing risk-based 
security techniques that are portrayed to increase efficiency and security generally. Through the increasing 
routinization of risk there is also a simultaneous routinization of the exclusion of human rights, privacy, 
freedom, and democracy as well as a host of other liberal concerns as potential variables in the discourse of 
security. 
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 Risk identification demands more risk calculation ad nauseam. Risk, as Ericson (2007) alluded to, 
is essentially a self-fulfilling prophesy in that the more risk there is, the more uncertainty is created, 
resulting in greater reliance on risk to conquer the unknowable. This ultimately leads to the assumption that 
in order to achieve liberalism and freedom, neo-liberal notions of risk and surveillance must reign supreme. 
The security discourse becomes economized at the exclusion of all potential variables that cannot be 
measured or that act in opposition to neo-liberal economic goals. Security becomes, in effect, neo-liberal.  
What are the Implications for Governmentality Studies? 
 The above findings have key implications for governmentality studies in two particular ways. 
Methodologically, the results of this thesis have important implications for future governmentality studies. 
Namely, by considering all interest groups involved in the BBWG consultation process this thesis was able 
to show that the construction of security in the Action Plan “tidy text” systematically differed from 
constructions offered in the consultation process in patterned ways. While the consultation process 
contained a variety of different discourses regarding the construction of security, problematized behaviour, 
and subsequent remedies used, the Action Plan was much more selective and discriminate in its selection of 
discourses. As was found above, security in the Action Plan involved an overwhelmingly neo-liberal 
construction in that a vast majority of business interest group discourses surrounding security were adopted 
while individual Canadian citizen and other interest group discourses were far more selectively 
incorporated. This is an important finding for the field of governmentality studies given that official tidy 
texts are found to be subject to the political process of selection characterized in Ericson (2007) in which 
some harms are given attention while others are effectively ignored. As such, governmentality studies must 
adapt away from simply examining official texts to move beyond implicit assumptions about how security 
is constructed within contemporary society by delving into the broad kaleidoscope of constructions 
provided by the independent and interconnected views of states, private industry, private citizens, NGOs, 
other interest groups, and so forth. Only then can governmentality studies truly locate the changing nexus of 
power/knowledge behind the constitution of a distinctive dispositif de sécurité and its associated “security 
technologies and practices operating according to their own particular logic” (Foucault 2007 as cited in 
Dillon 2008: 311). In the case of this thesis, only by moving beneath official “tidy texts” (Lippert and 
Stenson 2010) was this thesis able to truly understand how certain conduct was rendered problematic, and 
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how these problematic activities were remedied through a political process involving the Action Plan itself. 
In short, this thesis should inform governmentality studies in that to simply examine tidy texts is to 
essentially ignore “the historically sedimented underpinnings of particular problematizations” (Barry et al., 
1996: 5 as cited in Lippert and Stenson 2010: 477). 
 Second, it should be noted that in keeping with the theme of governmentality and the Foucauldian 
understanding of security, as well as the conflicting presentations of security discussed in the Literature 
Review section of this thesis, that the construction of an economized, risk-based, neo-liberal security 
consistent with the Action Plan on Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness is only relevant in 
this particular examination. While this thesis has contributed to the criminological literature by examining 
the construction of security within a specific context, it is also the case that this thesis should serve as 
impetus for future research to examine the construction of security in different contexts in order to further 
develop our understanding of security as it pertains to the field of governmentality. It is essential to realize 
the dispositif de sécurité identified in this thesis is only relevant given the power/knowledge nexus behind 
the broad kaleidoscope of constructions provided by the independent and interconnected views of 
government, private industry, private citizens, and other interest groups involved in consultations on the 
Action Plan on Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness specifically. In other words, it is entirely 
conceivable and probable that the dispositif de sécurité will differ greatly in this context compared to 
another context involving a different complex of social actors and thus also different constructions 
surrounding security. In this respect, the purpose of this thesis was not to provide a construction of security 
to be applied to all contexts indiscriminately, but rather to perhaps stimulate future governmentality studies 
that move beyond standardized or preconceived constructions of security and focus instead on how 
constructions change on a case-by-case basis depending on how different complexes of competing social 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 A Foucauldian governmentality analysis relies on how certain forces, events, or authorities act to 
problematize the conduct of persons, or, in other words, how certain actions or non-actions of individuals 
come under the scope of governmental control to achieve certain ends. In this sense, governmentality looks 
beyond the state as the sole contributor of what behaviours become problematized and instead considers the 
state as only a part of a complex whereby various other social actors provide input and mediate what is 
defined as problematic as well as the best way for remedying such conduct. Through a Foucauldian 
discourse analysis, this thesis moved beyond the “official tidy texts” (Lippert and Stenson 2010) to discover 
the language and other signifying systems that are elements in forming and shaping realities and 
subjectivities, which in turn render reality governable (Rose et al. 2006: 89). By using the governmentality 
perspective described by Rose (1999), Dillon (2008), and Lippert and Senson (2010), and posited in 
Foucault (2007), this thesis has examined the Canada-United States Action Plan on Perimeter Security and 
Economic Competitiveness consultations to identify how particular actors construct security, the realization 
of particular forms of conduct as problematic and in need of remedy, and the remedies proposed. This 
ultimately led to the determination of how security was constructed within the specific context of the Action 
Plan itself and whether the various constructions were represented there. 
 In the context of the Action Plan it was discovered that neo-liberal discourses tended to dominate 
the construction of security. Neo-liberal discourses largely originated from business interest group 
submissions to the Beyond the Border Working Group suggesting that overall, business interest groups had 
the most influence designating behaviours as problematic and suggesting potential remedies. However, it 
must also be noted that individual citizens and other interest groups also contributed to the construction of 
security. The neo-liberal claims of individual citizens and other interest groups were often incorporated in 
the Action Plan directly, such as the notion that immigration is problematic and that increased enforcement 
is necessary to remedy this problem. However, the analysis above determined that in examining all social 
actor discourses, the neo-liberal construction of security found in the “tidy text” of the Action Plan 
systematically differed in patterned ways from the constructions offered by the various interest groups 
involved in the consultation process. The neo-liberal construction of security found in the Action Plan was 
but one of many constructions of security offered by the various interest groups. Ultimately, while neo-
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liberalism formed the cornerstone of the construction of security in the Action Plan, other discourses were 
ultimately ignored. This finding allowed this thesis to therefore make a key conclusion about the 
construction of security in relation to the Action Plan that otherwise would have been absent if only the 
Action Plan (a tidy text) had been examined. As such, this thesis should serve as further impetus for 
governmentality studies to move beyond official tidy texts to identify the governmentality and power 
relations present.  
 In addition, this thesis demonstrated that the construction of an economized, risk-based, neo-liberal 
security consistent with the Action Plan on Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness is only 
relevant in this particular examination and that this thesis should serve as impetus for future research to 
examine the construction of security in different contexts in order to further develop our understanding of 
security as it pertains to the field of governmentality. In this way, the purpose of this thesis was not to 
provide a construction of security to be applied to all contexts indiscriminately, but rather to perhaps 
stimulate research so that the literature can move beyond standardized or preconceived constructions of 
security and focus instead on how constructions change on a case-by-case basis depending on how 
competing social actors contribute to shaping individual constructions. 
 It should be noted that certain limitations apply to this examination of the construction of security. 
Particularly, the researcher was limited to the documents provided by the Government of Canada, business 
interest groups, and by other interest groups. While the submissions received are generally representative of 
the types of various groups involved in the consultation process, it is impossible to generalize these findings 
to the Canadian population as a whole; individual businesses, business groups, or other interest groups not 
explicitly mentioned as consultation partners; or potential other parties involved in shaping public policy 
such as lobby groups, NGOs, and international partners. Therefore, findings mentioned above are confined 
in that they represent the views of groups that submitted to the BBWG directly. Furthermore, in this same 
respect, while making comparisons between frequently occurring discourses both between and within 
groups as well as in the Action Plan itself was accomplished in this thesis, it is difficult to make conclusions 
about specific discourses that were infrequently mentioned by interest groups and the state. For instance, 
while environmentalism, Aboriginal self-governance, health care, poverty, and the exclusion of Mexico 
from this Action Plan are examples of discourses occasionally but infrequently mentioned in constructions 
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of security, it is difficult to conclude whether these discourses were largely excluded from the Action Plan 
given that they were potentially routinized as unimportant to the neo-liberal construction of security, or if 
these discourses were simply excluded because of their infrequent mention in submissions made to the 
BBWG. In essence, while this thesis was able to examine what was explicitly present in the consultation 
documentation as well as the Action Plan document, it is difficult to reach informed conclusions about 
those discourses that are in fact not present or otherwise infrequently present.  
 As well, since much of the consultation of individual municipalities, provinces, territories, and 
other agencies of government occurred behind closed doors, orally, and without any written publicly 
available or otherwise attainable records, it was near impossible to determine just how governments 
constructed security in regard to the Action Plan during the consultation process. Other than the Action Plan 
itself and Hansard Reports from the House of Commons, it is very difficult to protract the “government 
discourses” in any meaningful way except on a post hoc basis. Future research on the Action Plan itself or 
government policy generally should seek to find ways to understand how government discourses ultimately 
mediate constructions and influence public policy directly and in coordination with other interest groups 
prior to the actual formation of policy. Lastly, it should be noted that as stated in the Action Plan itself, 
“Nothing in this Action Plan is intended to give rise to rights or obligations under domestic or international 
law; this Action Plan is not intended to constitute an international treaty under international law” (GOC 
2011a: II). In other words, while the constructions of security in the Action Plan on Perimeter Security and 
Economic Competitiveness point to important conclusions about the relationship between the state and 
various interested parties, this particular construction of security may only remain an “in theory” 
construction unless the Canadian and U.S. governments actually collaborate together to implement the 
discourses, solutions to problematized behaviour, and so forth included in the Action Plan itself. In this 
sense, this thesis is limited to strictly the “planned” construction of security, and further research will only 
be able to assess the construction of security in reality if and only if the Action Plan becomes policy and 
thus also “realized” in order for the planned construction of security to become the practiced construction 
of security.  
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  1	  These agreements include the Smart Border Declaration and Action Plan of 2001, the Safe Third Country 
Agreement of 2004, and the continued existence of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams and ongoing 
cross-border operations.	  2	  ‘‘The supply chain encompasses all activities associated with the flow and transformation of goods from 
raw materials stage (extraction), through to the end user, as well as the associated information flows. 
Material and information flow both up and down the supply chain. Supply chain management (SCM) is the 
integration of these activities through improved supply chain relationships to achieve a sustainable 
competitive advantage’’ (Handfield and Nichols 1999 as cited in Seuring and Muller 2008).	  3	  NEXUS is a risk-based program administered by Canada and the United States that is designed to 
expedite the border security process for low-risk, pre-approved travellers into Canada and the United States.	  4 Partners in Protection (PIP) is a CBSA program that involves the voluntary cooperation of private 
industry to enhance border and supply chain security. Members agree to adhere to higher principles of 
security management in exchange for lowered inspection rates at the physical border and other benefits.	  5 Free and Secure Trade (FAST) is a joint CBSA / CBP program that involves the voluntary cooperation of 
private industry to enhance border and supply chain security. All FAST program participants must undergo 
a risk assessment and be designated as low-risk in order to accelerate crossings at the physical border.	  6 While the Access to Information Request asked for all 1000 individual citizen responses, Industry Canada 
provided these approximately 432 individual responses and then filed an extension under the Access to 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act for the approximately 550 other pages of documentation 
amounting to about 568 responses. The 432 individual responses had previously been provided based on 
another ATI request and was therefore available to be sent immediately to the researcher. Industry Canada 
said that the rest of the files could not be processed in time and due to staffing and other constraints had to 
file the extension on the remainder. At the time of publication, the files included in the extension had still 
not been provided.	  7	  At the time of publication, those charged with Driving Under the Influence (DUI) or Driving While 
Intoxicated (DWI) in the United States may be prohibited from entering Canada under Canadian 
immigration law. This also applies under U.S. immigration law to Canadians with similar charges 
attempting to enter the United States.	  8	  For explanations of the societal CSI effect as well as the presentation of technology as being naturally 
infallible, see for example Muller (2004), Campbell (2010), Durnal (2010), Huey (2010), Elerbrok (2011).	  9	  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a regional agreement between the Government 
of Canada, the Government of Mexico, and the Government of the United States of America to implement a 
continental free trade area.	  10	  Under the Schengen Agreement, transiting from one member country to another within the Schengen 
Zone is done without border controls. Visa requirements only apply when entering the Zone and freedom of 
movement prevails afterwards.	  11	  Maher Arar is a dual Syrian and Canadian citizen who was detained in the United States on a layover 
upon returning from a vacation overseas. The U.S. INS was acting on faulty intelligence supplied by the 
RCMP that Arar was a national security risk involved in terrorist activities. The U.S. used extraordinary 
rendition to deport Arar to Syria (even though his home was in Canada) where he was tortured. The RCMP 
and Government of Canada have since acknowledged they provided inaccurate information to U.S. officials 
ultimately leading to Arar’s torture.	  12	  The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) governs how private 
sector organizations in Canada collect, use, and disclose personal information.	  13	  See submissions mentioned in this thesis made by the Council of Canadians, the Canadian Centre for 
Policy Alternatives, as well as submissions made by individual Canadian citizens concerned about state 
constructions of security. 14 Just in time is characterized by a rapid and smooth delivery rate that leaves no idle inventory present 
anywhere in the supply chain and no unnecessary lead times (Svensson 2002). Just in time manufacturing 
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relies inherently on the tenants of neo-liberalism to function accordingly, namely, the desire to reduce 
inefficiencies in the supply chain in order to maximize profit.	  15	  The essential understanding of Agile Six Sigma is that it is a means to reduce risk and therefore improve 
supply chain management by systematically squeezing out time-related variability (Peck 2006: 133). The 
overall position of Agile Six Sigma is that as reliability improves in terms of time-related activities in the 
supply chain, overall cycle times can also be reduced thus improving customer responsiveness and reducing 
costs to the business and consumer (Peck 2006: 133).	  16	  See for example House of Commons Hansard Report debates about border security and Canada-U.S. 
relations from 2011: June 13, September 19, October 6, October 25, November 28, November 29, 
November 30, December 6, December 7, December 8, December 9, December 11, December 12, December 
15.	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